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MELVILLE'S BILLYBUDD AND
PLATO'S REPUBLIC:
SEA CAPTAINS AND PHILOSOPHER-KINGS
Robert Atkinson*
This article shows how Melville's Billy Budd, rightly one of law
and literature's most widely studied canonical texts, answers Plato's
challenge in Book X of the Republic: Show how "poets" create better
citizens, especially better rulers, or banish them from the commonwealth
of reasoned law. Captain Vere is a flawed but instructive version of the
Republic's philosopher-king, even as his story is precisely the sort of
"poetry" that Plato should willingly allow, by his own republican
principles, into the ideal polity. Not surprisingly, the novella shows how
law's agents must be wise, even as their law must be philosophical, if
they are to do justice. Paradoxically, the novella also shows how
"poetry" can save law's agents, particularly the more Platonic, from
Captain Vere's "veer, " a dangerous turn from fully legal justice to false
and fatal severity.
Captain Vere has a "tragic flaw" all too common among leaders
otherwise completely conscientious and competent: When faced with a
range of courses-all egal, moral, and practicable- Vere invariably
charts the most personally painful. Part of his "no pain, no gain" course
steers him into fastidious studies that exclude both "mere" fiction and
"pure" theory, ironically banishing Plato himself along with his
"poets" But Vere's own story, with its narrator's frequent theoretical
interruptions and occasional allusions to Plato, demonstrates that the
reading ofjust such stories may deliver leaders like him from over-harsh
treatment of themselves and their most vulnerable charges. The novella,
then, not only reveals Captain Vere's "veer"; it also shows a way to
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avert that ever dangerous, often fatal tack. If the studious captain had
been prepared to study stories like his own, his readings might have
made him a vastly better guardian of his symbolic flock, particularly of
Billy Budd, his most innocent sheep; had "Starry" Vere been more a
philosopher-king and less a surrogate father-god, he need never have
made his excruciating mistake, sacrificing his most beloved foster son to
save their microcosmic world.
I. INTRODUCTION
From the very beginning of the modem law and literature
movement, Melville's Billy Budd has been one of its most widely
studied canonical texts, perhaps its ur-text.1 Rightly so. As a generation
of scholarship has amply shown, Billy Budd raises fundamental
questions of law, of literature, and, most importantly, of their
intersections and synergies. And yet more remains to be said;2 Billy
Budd deserves even more prominence, and clearer pre-eminence, in the
law and literature canon. It helps us see, not only why law needs
literature, but also literature, law, if we are to achieve a properly
republican3 law, rule by the wise for the commonwealth. On that vital
1. For the preeminence of the novella in law and literature scholarship see THOMAS
MORAWETZ, LITERATURE AND THE LAW xxviii (2007) (citing Billy Budd as one of the "obvious
examples" of "the most familiar texts in law and literature, works that have been extensively
covered elsewhere."); see also Symposium, Inaugural Issue Dedicated to Billy Budd, 1
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Cardozo Symposium] (devoting its first volume to
Melville's seminal novella Billy Budd). For many years, the preeminent edition had been HERMAN
MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (AN INSIDE NARRATIVE) (Harrison Hayford & Merton M. Sealts,
Jr., eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1962) (1891) [hereinafter BILLY BUDD]. See Daniel Tritter, Preface
to the Symposium: A Lusty Voice, 1 CARDOZo STUD. L. & LITERATURE IV, IV (1989) (describing
the Hayford & Sealts' edition of Billy Budd as the "urtext of the Melville work"). But in 2017
Harrison Hayford, among others, composed a new edition that heavily draws upon, and yet revises,
the 1962 edition. See Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative), in 13 BILLY BUDD,
SAILOR AND OTHER UNCOMPLETED WRITINGS 1 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds., Northwestern Univ.
Press & Newberry Lib. ed., 2017) (1891) [hereinafter MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD].
2. Indeed, as Barbara Johnson has pointed out, although critical debate has tended to assume
that Billy Budd, for all its ambiguity, is Melville's "last word," the story itself seems, in both its
structure and its content, to call the very nature of ending into question. BARBARA JOHNSON,
Melville's Fist: The Execution of Billy Budd, in THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE: ESSAYS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC OF READING 79-81 (1980).
3. I choose the term "republican" with genuine trepidation; it means too many things to too
many people. None of those meanings is quite right for my purposes, but no other term serves
nearly so well. No one versed in legal scholarship of the last two decades will mistake my
"republicanism" for the principles of the contemporary Republican Party in the United States,
although what I mean by that term is actually quite close to what some scholars believe to have been
Abraham Lincoln's own understanding of republicanism. See GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT
WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 312-18 (2000) [hereinafter BINDER & WEISBERG]
(summarizing the views of legal scholar Alexander Bickel and historian Harry Jaffa). My use of the
"republicanism" is more likely to be confused with the recent movement in legal scholarship known
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point, as we shall see, legal scholarship has as much to teach as it has to
learn; perhaps what it most needs to learn is how much it has to teach.
This Article will show how Billy Budd answers, and expands, the
possibilities of republican law set out in Plato's Republic. From that
perspective, Captain Vere is nothing less than a flawed but instructive
version of the Republic's philosopher-king, and the telling of his story is
precisely the sort of "poetry" that Plato would willingly allow, by his
own republican principles, into his ideal polity. On this republican
reading, the law and Vere, its agent, can, and indeed must, be improved:
the law, through agents like Vere, through the right kind of literature, the
kind that rightly understands law. On this reading, law is a far more
sophisticated means of balancing social needs and individual interests
than any but the most legally sophisticated can appreciate. To achieve
the proper balance of the personal and the political, law's agents must
themselves be legally sophisticated. And, more basically, they must be
free of a dangerous tropism, the Captain Vere veer,4 from which they
cannot free themselves.
On the most radically republican reading, law, in the hands of
properly literate lawyer-philosophers, can displace traditional theistic
notions of human salvation with the realizable hope of rational,
humanistic law. The lesson of a republican reading of Billy Budd is that
the law can confer its benefits on the many without sacrificing the life of
its most vulnerable, but only if its agents are wise in a way that nothing
but proper literature can make them. To put the matter most pointedly, if
Captain Vere had been a better reader, and better read, he could have
as "civic republicanism." See generally Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ.
1493 (1988). My colleague Steven Gey, along with a host of others, has lamented the limitations of
that movement. See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 801, 861-62 (1993) (expressing concern with "the potentially totalitarian overtones of civic
republican thought" as a result of its moral deference to majority rule). Although I myself think that
movement's merits were many, it is, for better or worse, well past its pinnacle of even academic
prominence. See Rob Atkinson, Reviving the Roman Republic, Remembering the Good Old Cause,
71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1187, 1189-91 (2003). More importantly, my own sympathies lie more with
classical republicanism, than with its revived, late-twentieth-century incarnation. See id. That, as
even its proponents acknowledge, was more "deliberative democracy" or "left-liberalism" than
genuine neo-classical republicanism. As this Article will show, my preference is aggressively neo-
classical; its ideal is the republicanism of Plato's Republic (properly purged of Plato's apparent, but
I think non-essential, meta-ethical realism). Stated less abstractly, its goal is to ensure that every
child born in the world has a reasonable chance of acquiring the kind of education necessary to rule
as a Platonic guardian.
4. I am not the first to notice this pun. See, e.g., Richard H. Weisberg, Accepting the Inside
Narrator's Challenge: Billy Budd and the "Legalistic Reader," 1
CARDozo STUD. L. & LrrERATuRE 27, 29 (1989) ("mankind's awful 'vere-ing' from the glory of
Nelson and times past to the repressed wordiness and pragmatic utilitarianism of our present age").
But I do use it in a distinctive way, to describe a previously unnoticed aspect of the story.
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saved the allied fleet, and with it the rule of law, without killing the
innocent Billy Budd.
This Article adds to the expanding conversation about Billy Budd in
two related directions. The first is identifying the "Vere veer" of the title.
Focusing on the character of the ship's commanding officer, Captain
Vere, we can read the novella as the cautionary tale of a dangerous
character type, the dutiful leader with a tropism toward the most painful
among plausible answers. This reading diagnoses Captain Vere's
defining neurosis as the tendency, all too common among a class of
completely conscientious leaders, when faced with a range of courses-
all legally, morally, and practically viable-to take the most personally
painful. This tendency has, of course, its comic exemplars: the high
school coach' or military drill sergeant6 with a humorously insistent "no
pain/ no gain" policy. But this tropism has tragic elements as well: the
"spare-the-rod-and-spoil-the-child" parent who genuinely means "this
hurts me more than it hurts you." When taken into positions of real
power, this tragic tendency reaches truly epic proportions, as old as
Abraham and Isaac,7 as new as Letters from Iwo Jima.8 As we shall see,
it may even infect the most orthodox version of Western Christianity,
with its paradoxical insistence on God the Father's sacrifice of his
innocent son to save a sinful world.
The first aim of this Article, then, is to diagnose the Vere veer; its
second, and more ambitious aim is to prescribe a cure, or at least outline
a preventive regime for republican leaders-in-training. The novella, on
this reading, not only reveals the Vere veer; it also implicitly offers a
way of averting that ever dangerous, often fatal tropism. The novella
itself, we shall see, both shows us what Captain Vere himself has failed
to read and operates as a means of educating the next generation of
Captain Veres. Here we will see Melville wrestling with matters of
pedagogical substance and form that take him back-sometimes
explicitly, sometimes implicitly-to three of the deepest divides in
Western thought: the debate over fundamental human nature,
particularly the question of perfectibility or original sin, that has always
divided Jerusalem and Athens, Judeo-Christian theology and Greco-
5. See, e.g., Rip Torn's character, 'Patches O'Houlihan', in DODGEBALL: A TRUE
UNDERDOG STORY (Twentieth Century Fox 2004); see also, e.g., Billy Bob Thorton's character,
Jasper Woodcock, in MR. WOODCOCK (Avery Pix 2007).
6. See, e.g., Frank Sutton's character, Sergeant Vince Carter, in Gomer Pyle, U.SM.C.
(Andy Griffith Enterprises 1964); see also, e.g., Goldie Hawn's sergeant in PRIVATE BENJAMIN
(Warner Bros. 1980).
7. Genesis 22.
8. LETTERS FROM IWO JIMA (Warner Bros. 2007); see also TADAMICHI KURIBAYASHI,
PICTURE LETTERS FROM THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (Tsuyoko Yoshida ed., 2007).
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Roman philosophy; "the war of poetry with philosophy" that Plato
identifies in the final book of the Republic; and the tension between
social science and the humanities that has bedeviled the law and
literature movement itself from its beginnings.
Part II of this Article places it in the context of on-going scholarly
analysis of Billy Budd.9 In particular, this Part reviews two aspects of the
current scholarship on Captain Vere, the substantive conclusions that
Melville scholarship has reached in its analysis of the novella and the
interdisciplinary modes of analysis that that scholarship has employed to
reach those conclusions. On the substantive side, Subpart A synthesizes
the original critical view that the novel presents a positive perspective on
the law and Captain Vere with the revisionist view that something is
radically wrong with the result, the execution of Billy Budd.10 On the
formal side, the Subpart B of Part II shows that, to reach their
substantive positions on the novella, whether for Vere and the law or
against them, scholars have inevitably, if only implicitly, crossed what
are now seen as disciplinary lines." The modem law and literature
movement is but the latest and most explicit aspect of this
interdisciplinarity. Quite rightly, that movement has conceded, even
insisted, that law needs to be informed by the insights of literature; this
Part raises the possibility that to properly understand republican texts
like Billy Budd, literary criticism must, for its part, understand law
as well.
Parts III and IV explore these two aspects of the novella, the
substantive and the interdisciplinary, in greater detail. Part III finds the
source of the novella's tragic result in the flawed character of the
generally virtuous Captain Vere.12 It analyzes that character flaw, the
"Vere veer" of the title, first in the microcosm of HMS Bellipotent, in
the case of Billy Budd, then in the macrocosm of Christian theology,
especially in the soteriological doctrine of Christ's atoning death.
Captain Vere's failure as a "father figure" to Billy Budd, we shall see,
strongly suggests a similar failing of the very God-the-Father-Almighty
of whom Vere is unmistakably meant to remind us. If, as Melville
implies, God, like Vere, is too severe, then perhaps the world-order of
orthodox Christianity, like Vere's shipboard world, would be improved
by the same reform of law and character that the novella implicitly holds
up for us, extrapolated onto a universal scale.
9. See infta Part I.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part II.
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Part IV takes up the second issue raised by prior criticism of the
novella, the relationship of various disciplines and discourses.1 3 Along
those lines, it explores the three great divides that Billy Budd tries to
bridge: between "theories" of human perfectibility and "perceptions" of
radical evil, or, more briefly if less accurately, "rationality versus
irrationality"; between fiction and philosophy, or, classically, "poetry"
and "dialectic"; and between social science and the humanities,
"analysis" and "intuition." It finds that Melville handles the first two
masterfully, reconciling classical rationality with Judeo-Christian
original sin by re-integrating literature with philosophy. He fails in the
third, his effort to subordinate social science to literary insight or
religious intuition, but in a way that paradoxically reinforces the other
two points. Republic leaders who read the novella don't need social
science to verify the condition of Captain Vere, but for a very peculiar
reason. In this very special case, what literature reveals without the aid
of social science is not "the other," but an aspect of our own "otherness,"
a critical alienation from our truer, better selves, the selves that the
Republic needs us to be, both for ourselves and for its most vulnerable
citizens, those Billy Budds whose captains we must be.
II. CURRENT DIVISIONS IN SCHOLARSHIP ON CAPTAIN VERE
The scholarship on the character of Captain Vere (not to mention
that on Billy Budd more generally) is voluminous. Here we need to
look-in the most summary, and necessarily somewhat schematic,
fashion-at two aspects of Vere scholarship. By way of shorthand, we
will call these the substantive and the interdisciplinary. By
"substantive," I mean the actual conclusions critics have reached about
various aspects of the novella; by "interdisciplinary," I mean the
overlapping disciplines, or academic discourses, these critics have had to
employ, or at least borrow from, to reach those conclusions. Like all
shorthands, this one is imperfect, but it highlights two critical elements
we need to isolate for more detailed analysis in Parts III and IV.
As we shall see, criticism of Billy Budd, though predominantly
"literary" originally, has always been interdisciplinary. In particular,
from the very beginning commentators have not restricted themselves to
assessing the novella's independent aesthetic merits or to discerning its
author's intended or unconscious meanings; they have also evaluated its
political and moral messages. Their analysis, in other words, has always
been normative as well as descriptive; what is more, their normative
13. See infra Part IV.
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analysis has always been moral and political as well as aesthetic. The
advent of the law and literature movement has been but a particularly
salient phase of this aboriginal, if not inevitable, interdisciplinarity. To
fully understand Billy Budd, its critics have implicitly understood from
the start, scholarship has to be interdisciplinary; we shall see, in more
detail that one of those disciplines needs to be law.
A. Substance: The Cases for and Against Captain Vere and the Law
Virtually everyone agrees that Captain Vere faced a terrible
situation, a suspicious homicide aboard a warship on a military mission,
and that the result of his decision was tragic: the sacrifice of an innocent
sailor to prevent a military, and quite possibly geopolitical, disaster.
Beyond that, critical opinion divides in two basic directions, for and
against Vere's decision. We can find, without too much tugging and
hauling, a familiar, almost Hegelian, pattern4 : first, in supporters of
Vere and the law, then in their opponents.15 My own republican reading,
we will see, is a synthesis of these two positions.
1. The Thesis: Billy Budd as Melville's "Testament of
Acceptance"6
The traditional view of Billy Budd favors Captain Vere's decision.
More precisely, it affirms not one but three basic theses: The relevant
law was essentially good (or at least as good as it could be), Vere was
right to follow the law more or less to the letter, and Melville himself is
resigned to the tragic result. Affirming all three sub-theses is the
"strong" version of the pro-Vere position, some scholars are "softer" on
14. Harrison Hayford & Merton M. Sealts, Jr., Editors' Introduction to BILLY BUDD, supra
note 1, at 25-27 [hereinafter Hayford & Sealts, Introduction] (summarizing this pattern of
scholarship); JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 101 ("And the very direction of Billy Budd criticism itself,
historically moving from acceptance to irony, is no doubt itself interpretable in the same historical
terms.").
15. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 79, 82 (contrasting "acceptance," "tragedy," or
"necessity" thesis with "irony," "injustice," or "social criticism" antithesis); see also, e.g., Hayford
& Sealts, Introduction, supra note 14, at 25-27. As Johnson points out, this critical split reflects
deep structural and thematic elements of the novel itself, having to do with the relation of character
to action, Billy Budd's literalism and John Claggart's ironism, textual support for both
"psychoanalytic" and "metaphysical" readings, and support for both "historical" and a-historical
assessments of Vere's decisions. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 82, 85, 91, 101. But the Hegelian
pattern is not, of course, perfect. See Hayford & Sealts, Introduction, supra note 14, at 27 ("The
moral-religious-metaphysical approach continues ... broaden[ing] the discussion beyond the
black-and-white antithesis of tragedy versus comedy, acceptance versus resistance, and cases for or
against Captain Vere.").




some points than others, and scholars who maintain this thesis have
differed among themselves over the novella's central character, with the
earlier scholars tending to focus more on Billy Budd than on Vere.17 But
this thesis, in more or less strong form, gained wide acceptance among
the first generation of Melville scholars" and has continued to find
adherents down to the present.'9
2. The Antithesis: Billy Budd as Melville's "Testament of
Resistance"20
Revisionist views emerged with particular force after World War II.
Revisionists could, and did, deny any of the traditional view's three sub-
theses: the goodness of the law, the appropriateness of Vere's adherence
to it, or Melville's acceptance of the result. The more aggressive denied
them all. In their view, stated most aggressively, the relevant law was
unjust, Vere was wrong to follow it, and Melville meant to signal to us
his disapproval of both, if only in the most subtle of ironic tones. On this
view, Vere may indeed be the novella's central character, but he is a
villain, not a hero, tragic or otherwise, and Melville would have us see
the error, even evil, not only of Vere's particular ways, but also of the
law's inevitable course.2 '
17. See Hayford & Sealts, Introduction, supra note 14, at 25-26.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Charles Reich, The Tragedy of Justice in Billy Budd 56 YALE REV. 368 (1967),
reprinted in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MELVILLE'S BILLY BUDD, SAILOR 127, 137 (Robert Milder ed.,
1989) ("Vere has been condemned for being a ramrod, but quite plainly he stands like a musket in
order to control the feelings within him."); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE
170 (rev. and enlarged ed. 1998) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE] (describing Vere as
"a sensitive man, and not a martinet, finds himself torn between private feeling and public duty.
Vere chooses the latter.").
20. See Phil Withim, Billy Budd: Testament of Resistance, 20 MOD. LANGUAGE Q. 115, 115-
27 (1959).
21. Robin West, Invisible Victims: A Comparison of Susan Glaspell's Jury of Her Peers, and
Hernwm Melville's Bartleby the Scrivener, 8 CARDOZO STUD. LAW & LIT. 203, 204, 224-25 (1996)
(discussing, in contrast to the character of Bartleby in Melville's eponymous short story, how Vere
is, as scholar Richard Weisberg asserts, a creature of ressentiment; law is an instrument not only of
victimization, but also of the legitimation of victimization); see also Richard H. Weisberg, 20 Years
(or 2000?) of Story-Telling on the Law: Is Justice Detectable?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2223, 2228-29
(2005) (providing retrospection on his ressentiment thesis); Daniel J. Solove, Melville's Billy Budd
and Security in Times of Crisis, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 2443, 2444, 2454 (2005) ("build[ing] upon
Weisberg's challenging interpretation of Vere," Solove depicts Vere as "the locus of the problem");
wILLIAM V. SPANOS, THE EXCEPTIONALIST STATE AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION: HERMAN
MELVILLE'S BILLY BUDD, SAILOR 32, 33 (2011) ("Far from being a 'testament of
acceptance ... Billy Budd, on the contrary, bears witness to the dying Melville's radical
worldliness" so that "Billy Budd becomes a text that 'speaks truth to power . . ."') (internal citations
omitted).
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3. Synthesis: A Republican Reading
My own view, like that of several other recent scholars,22 borrows a
bit from both the traditionalists and the revisionists, the pro-Vere thesis
and the anti-Vere antithesis. With the traditionalists, I argue that Captain
Vere is basically a model military commander; more strongly, if
anything, I see him as almost a model philosopher-king in the
microcosm of his ship. Also with the traditionalists, I think that the legal
system in which he operated, flawed and human though it was, was
nonetheless basically sound. On the other hand, with the revisionists, I
think that the result Vere reached was not only horrifically and
unacceptably tragic, but also avertable and in a way that Melville must
have meant for us to see.
At the same time, I don't believe, with the revisionists, that the fault
lay in the law or with Vere's slavish following of the law. Much less do I
believe, with the traditionalists, that the execution of Billy Budd, though
humanly tragic, was legally inevitable or politically just. Rather, I
conclude that, had Vere not fallen victim to a tragic flaw, a neurotic
tropism, in his own character,2 3 he could have found an easy way, well
within the law, if properly understood, both to save Billy Budd and to
protect the fleet, the realm, and, literally and figuratively, the rule of
law itself.
Making that case will be the work of Part 111.24 Before turning to
that, we need to examine another aspect of scholarship on Billy Budd, its
essential interdisciplinarity, particularly, its need for a sophisticated
understanding of the law.
22. See Robert P. Lawry, Justice in Billy Budd, in LAW AND LrTERATURE PERSPECTIVES 169,
169-71 (Bruce L. Rockwood, ed., 1996) (positing "[m]y tentative conclusion is that no injustice was
done; yet the absence of injustice is insufficient to warrant the further conclusion that justice was
done," based on Lon Fuller's distinction between the morality of duty, which Vere fulfilled, and the
morality of aspiration, at which he failed.); see also William Domnarski, Law-Literature Criticism:
Charting a Desirable Course with Billy Budd, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 702, 707-12 (1984) (analyzing
with approval and expanding the position of Christopher Sten and Charles Reich that Vere was a
good person faced with positive law that was, and perhaps had to be, inconsistent with natural
justice); cf. Solove, supra note 21, at 2444 ("[T]he law is not the culprit-it is something in Vere that
causes his failure.").
23. Here, with Robert P. Lawry, though less explicitly, I "advocate ... a shift in our moral
focus from rule breaking toward the pursuit of virtue, or from decision-point ethics to character
ethics." Lawry, supra note 22, at 171. I completely agree with Lawry that "[ilt is in character that
Vere was ultimately deficient," but I don't entirely agree that "he lacked courage and moral
imagination." Id. at 186. As we shall see, I locate his failure of character in a particular tropism. See
infra Part IIIA; see also JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 79 ("More recently, critical attention has
devoted itself to the ambiguity in the story, sometimes deploring it, sometimes revelling in it, and
sometimes simply listing it.").
24. See infra Part M.
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B. Methodology: Inevitable Interdisciplinarity
As we saw in the last section, scholars have long been divided
substantively into pro- and anti-Vere camps. In this section, we examine
an odd feature shared by both camps: their tendency to transcend
disciplinary borders, strictly conceived.25 We will look, first, at the early,
primarily "literary" criticism and see how, from the beginning, it
borrowed, if more often implicitly than explicitly, from allied
humanities. We will then look at how the advent of the law and literature
movement added not only new partisans to the dispute, but also another
discipline, with its own tendency to transcend, in its analysis of Billy
Budd, any pre-conceived disciplinary constraints.
This insistence on interdisciplinarity, of course, has always been an
article of faith in the law and literature movement, particularly with
respect to Billy Budd, the movement's ur-canonical text.2 6 What we shall
see is that the interdisciplinarity to which Billy Budd invites us should
take the movement in directions it has tended to ignore, even eschew. On
the one hand, legal scholars have been too modest in their insistence that
a proper understanding of the novella, and works of similarly ambitious
scope, require an understanding of the law. On the other hand, they have
tended to ignore that that understanding of the law requires an
appreciation of social science, especially psychology, that even Melville
seems to minimize, if not miss altogether.
1. Literary Critics Transcending the Narrowly "Literary"
From the beginning, literary criticism has raised both intramural
and extramural questions about Billy Budd on the one hand, questions
that are strictly literary; on the other hand, there are questions that
transcend the borders of the literary, at least as narrowly conceived.2 7
Moreover, both the intramural and the extramural questions have been
both descriptive and normative. We turn first to the intramural questions,
then to the extramural.
25. See Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE
LJ. 1059, 1075-78 (1999) (describing how both law scholars and literature scholars draw
disciplinary lines too narrowly).
26. See Editor's Preface to Cardozo Symposium, supra note I ("Our hope is that the subject
matter of CSLL's first number [Billy Budd] ... will further indicate to our readers the ambition of
Law-Literature studies to articulate issues that few if any unidisciplinary methods have
approached.").
27. See Baron, supra note 25, at 1075-78; see also cf. TERRY EAGLETON,LITERARY THEORY:
AN INTRODUCTION 8 (1983) (discussing in the abstract how literature is grounded in "its relations
with and differences from its surroundings" and is therefore quite difficult to "discriminate neatly
between 'practical' and 'non-practical' ways of relating ourselves to language.").
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a. Intramural Questions
It is important to see, at the outset, that literary analysis of Billy
Budd has raised both normative and descriptive issues within literature,
narrowly conceived. On the normative side, it raised, early on, a
fundamental question-"Is this great literature?"-and, at least by
implication-an even more basic question: "What is great literature?"
Using the standard of greatness current in their time, the first generation
of scholars actively questioned the literary merits of Billy Budd.
28 By the
time of the Revisionists, however, this question was essentially
abandoned;29 it was implicitly always answered in the affirmative, even
though critical standards of literary excellence had notably shifted.
Whatever the measure of literary merit, Billy Budd was deemed to meet
it; debate centered, as we have seen, on more substantive issues.
We, too, can take the literary merits of Billy Budd as given, at least
for now.o What we need to see here is that the question of literary merit
is, in its own right, a normative question; in particular, as asked by
earlier critics and answered implicitly by later ones, it was an aesthetic
question, a question about the work's "beauty" or artistic "goodness."
Seen that way, we can distinguish it from another class of questions that
critics asked about the book, questions that we might still call strictly
literary. For our purposes, it is important to see these as descriptive, as
opposed to normative, questions.
The most basic of this latter class of questions is, "How did
Melville mean for us to understand the character of Captain Vere and the
nature of the law?" As we have seen, the traditional view was that
Melville meant for us to see Vere and the law as good; the revisionist
view was the reverse. Both are a matter of interpretation, of getting at
Melville's meaning. Literary critics would, presumably, get at this
answer either by ordinary principles of linguistic analysis, or by some
special methods peculiar either to their field in general or to this sort of
text in particular.
28. See Hayford & Sealts Introduction, supra note 14, at 25 ("During the first twenty-five
years of criticism (1921-46) there was some disagreement over its literary merit .... .").
29. Id. at 26 ("[F]ew critics of the day [post-1946] were willing to entertain the strictures [of
some earlier critics] upon the esthetic qualities of Billy Budd . . . .").
30. See infra Part IV (suggesting that a republican reading of Billy Budd points to a radical





But the debate about Billy Budd raised other basic questions, too,
questions not so easily encompassed in the scope of "literature" as
traditionally conceived. These questions, like the more narrowly
"literary" ones we have just identified, are also both descriptive and
normative. On the descriptive side, Melville has the narrator ask very
specifically whether Captain Vere was psychologically impaired." To
answer this question, one must invoke standards other than the strictly
literary. This is a question of ordinary human experience and of a
particular discipline of social science. As we shall see, Melville has very
strong views about the source of the answer to this question, about the
right places to look for the answer.3 2 What we need to see here is that
those places are not, strictly speaking, literary ones-unless Melville
would have us expand the scope of "literary" quite a ways indeed.
Still on the descriptive side, but less explicitly, Melville raises
fundamental questions about the nature of law, questions that literary
scholars have not been shy about answering. To take but one example,
Barbara Johnson notes:
In the final analysis, the question is not, What did Melville really think
of Captain Vere? but rather, What is at stake in his way of presenting
him? What can we learn from him about the act of judging? . . . [Ilit is
judging, not murdering, that Melville is asking us to judge.33
Immediately after identifying these questions as fundamental, she
goes on to say, "And yet Vere's judgment is an act of murder."34 More
generally, as to the law itself, she concludes, "It would seem, then, that
the maintenance of political authority requires that the law function as a
set of rules for the regular, predictable misreading of the 'difference
within' as a 'difference between."'35
And, equally sweepingly and even more pessimistically, she also
concludes: "The legal order, which attempts to submit 'brute force' to
'forms, measured forms,' can only eliminate violence by transforming
violence into the final authority."36 This may, of course, be true; law
31. BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 102.
32. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
33. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 102.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 106.
36. Id. at 108-09; see also SUSAN WEINER, LAW IN ART: MELVILLE'S MAJOR FICTION AND
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LAW 145 (1992) ("For not only does Vere fail to obey correctly
the measured forms of the law, but the legal system itself is shown to be profoundly defective.");
Michael A. Kahn, From Shylock to Billy Budd: The Literary "Headline Trial," 55 ST. LOUIs U. LJ.
1329, 1330 (2011) (the lesson of "significant works of literature that use the courtroom as their
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may be every bit as limited in its potential, as brute in its reality, as she
asserts. But it is a surprisingly sweeping jurisprudential position-not to
mention a depressingly pessimistic one!-to ground on the reading of a
single novella, without reference to a single work of legal scholarship.
It is one thing to say that this radical jurisprudential pessimism is
Melville's own position; it is quite another to say that he is right in his
assessment. The first is a matter of getting at the author's meaning, a
quest, quixotic though it may be, well within the purview of a literary
scholar, as we have seen. The latter is, of course, a fundamental question
of law, for the answer to which a literary scholar might plausibly be
expected to seek, even if ultimately to reject, the insights of scholars in
that field-not to mention the arguments of political philosophers back
to the very Republic itself.
Thus critics of the novella, following Melville's lead in the novella,
have raised a range of normative questions that press beyond the bounds
of any narrow definition of literature. Critics have sought to discover,
not just whether Melville believed, or the novel propounded, that the law
was just and was Vere right to follow it, but also, whether the law really
was just, whether Vere really was right to follow it. These are not,
strictly speaking, literary, or even aesthetic, questions. They are, rather,
normative questions of a very different sort. In the case of Vere's
conduct, the question is essentially one of ethics; in the case of the
goodness or justice of the law, the question is one of political philosophy
or jurisprudence. In raising and answering these questions, literary
scholars have engaged, more often implicitly than explicitly, in wide-
ranging interdisciplinarity. (This observation itself, we should note, is
descriptive, not normative: To say that literary scholars have reached
outside their field is not to say that they have trespassed, much
less stolen.)
2. Legal Scholarship Transcending the Strictly "Legal"
Some of these interdisciplinary questions raised by literary critics
clearly fell within the province of law, even most narrowly conceived:
Was Captain Vere's conduct legal, in compliance with the letter of the
relevant laws in place at the time? Other questions implicate law at its
widest and most ambitious ambit: Was Vere's conduct right or good?
Was the outcome of the case just? Could Vere be made a better person?
Could human affairs be better ordered? In Part III, I will suggest that, as




a "disciplinary" matter, all these are properly legal questions.37 More
particularly, human affairs can indeed be ordered better; for that to
happen, Vere must be made a better person. For that to happen, in turn,
law must encompass his story; law must, in exactly the way Plato
prescribed, be both philosophical and literary. And-equally
importantly-though in a way Plato could not have anticipated, it must
become social scientific, too. The questions Billy Budd raises, in other
words, tell us a great deal about what we must read, how we must read
it, and with whose help.
As background for the claim that all these questions are properly
legal questions, we must take a preliminary look at each of the questions
in turn. Each, as we shall see, is revealingly related to the next: first, the
question of the legality, narrowly speaking, of Vere's conduct;38 next,
the justice of his conduct;39 and, finally, the sanity, the mental stability,
of his conduct.40
a. The "Strict" Legality of Vere's Conduct
The legality of Vere's conduct, narrowly conceived, might be
relevant to literary critics of Billy Budd in several ways, or not at all.
Let's begin with this last. On a strictly formalist, amoral reading, the
legality of Vere's conduct would be irrelevant, or nearly so. The law as
presented in the novella would only need to be plausible; we readers
would only need to be able to imagine that the law of the place and time
was something like that depicted in the novel. And even this is so,
significantly, only because Melville at least implicitly makes plausible
law a part of the "furniture" of the novel; plausible law need hardly be
part of the furniture or furnishings of every novel. Thus, for example, in
Kafka's The Trial' it is the very unreality of the law that most arrests
our attention. In novels that are more purely formal exercises, or purely
subjective expressions, the plausibility of the law within them may be
even less relevant; there need, of course, be no law in them at all.
For the novel to have any moral meaning, the "actual" legality of
Vere's conduct would have to be only slightly more significant. If, for
example, we were to read Billy Budd simply for its depiction of a ruler
faced with an agonizing choice between irreconcilable public law and
private morality, then we need only be able to take, as a sort of "given,"
37. See infra Part II.A.3-4.
38. See infra Part I.A.2.
39. See infra Part III.A.3.
40. See infra Part II.A.4.
41. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa & Edmund Muir trans., rev. by E.M. Butler, Alfred A.
Knopf Definitive Edition 1970) (1925).
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that the law requires of Vere what he thought it required. To understand
Creon, we need not know either the law of ancient Corinth or its familial
burial mores; we need only see them in plausible conflict. Billy Budd has
certainly been read that way, and profitably so: the picture of a tortured
soul, torn between incommensurable duties, public and private.4 2 From
this perspective, debate about whether the law was "really" as Melville
depicts it is, ultimately, completely beside the point, as several scholars
have pointed out.4 3
If the novel were, on the other hand, to be used as some sort of
"case study" of the justice of the British maritime code of the
Napoleonic era, then, by starkest contrast, depicting that code accurately
would be of prime importance. Doubtlessly, fiction is sometimes used
that way, too, perhaps profitably so. Certainly law school hypothetical
cases are, in a sense, that sort of "fiction." But that is hardly what
Melville had in mind in Billy Budd-nor is that what most commentators
have had in mind.44
The novella clearly raises, as Melville himself apparently intended,
a much larger legal issue: the condition of humankind under law. To
raise that issue, the legality of Vere's conduct, in the narrow sense of its
strict compliance with actual British naval law of the period in which the
story is set, is completely irrelevant, or very nearly so.45 For Melville's
larger purpose, the legality of Vere's conduct, in this narrow sense, need
only be plausible, like the rest of the story's "setting." It must merely fit
in convincingly with the rest of the novel's "furnishings."
And yet the legality of Vere's conduct must also be plausible in
another, much more significant way. It must be a plausible account, not
just of what the law was, but also of what the law can be, or cannot be. It
must give us, not only credible past law, but also credible future law.
This has both negative and positive implications. If, on the negative side,
the story is to show the tragic limits of the law, its inability, in some
cases or many or all, to reconcile the demands of society with the
42. See Reich, supra note 19, at 134-36.
43. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 149-50, 166; see also Domnarski,
supra note 22, at 711 ("The more Billy Budd criticism moves away from an investigation of the
applicability of particular statutes, the more we are able to see the legal issue at the novel's
center . .. the natural law/positive law conflict . . . .").
44. See Lawry, supra note 22, at 172 ("We must be careful ... to distinguish the law that
would have governed an incident such as the one described in Melville's story, if it had really
occurred, from the operative law of the story itself as set forth by the author.").
45. For a review of the debate on the legality of Vere's conduct under actual maritime law,
see sources cited in Lawry, supra note 22, at 188 n.4. For the view of Lawry and others that this is
essentially irrelevant to understanding the novel's essential meaning, see id. at 172-73; see also
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 149-50, 166.
11532019]1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
individual's most basic needs, then it must convincingly show that law
cannot be made better, cannot be reformed or applied in a way that really
does reconcile those demands. Otherwise, it is no more convincing an
account than a tale of sailors drowning in air, or suffering from scurvy
on a citrus-rich diet, or sailing off the edge of a flat earth.
On the positive side, if the story is to show that Billy Budd died
unnecessarily, then it must convince us that law can produce a better
result, an adequate alternative balancing of social and individual needs.
As the inaugural number of Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature
("CSLL") put it, "And if Billy did not have to die, we must seek to
answer the still more agonizing question how?"4 6 On this view, the
"ought" implies the "can." If, as I maintain, Vere failed in his use of the
law, I must be able to show that my alternative result is possible within a
plausible understanding of law's potential. I must, in other words, give
an account of the law that shows how a more just legal result can be
achieved. It is this latter that I undertake in Part III;47 for now we only
need to see that this position, like its opposite, implies a fairly robust
jurisprudence. And, as a corollary, to advance either an optimistic or a
pessimistic view of law's capacity, literary critics must themselves
understand the law.
This understanding involves, in the case of Billy Budd and
elsewhere, three critical, related points: the relationship between law and
equity, the critical role of legal agents' discretion in balancing those two
aspects of law, and the implications of that role for the scope of law
itself. On all three of these points, literary critics have made significant
errors in their judgments of Captain Vere and the law, in both directions,
for and against.
First, as Richard Posner nicely points out, every legal system has
two vitally related "tables" that go by various revealing but imperfect
short-hand names: the letter and the spirit, law and equity, rules and
principles, crystals and mud.48 A great deal of legal thinking, theoretical
and practical, ancient and modern, involves balancing these essentially
paired aspects in every phase of law's operation: in how laws are
written, in how they are applied, and in how those applications are
evaluated. Each of these three phases, we shall see in the next section,49
is critical in Billy Budd's case. Pending further proof, we can safely say,
following Posner, that Vere's problem cannot properly be reduced to one
of "legalism," a favoring of the side of rule and rigor over the side of
46. See Editor's Preface to Cardozo Symposium, supra note 1.
47. See infra Part II.
48. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 120.
49. See infra Part II.2.b.
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principled flexibility in acting and judging according to law.o Vere, we
shall see, was much more a Solomon than a Martinet.
Second, the need to balance the tables of "law" and "equity" in
acting and judging under law implies that law's agents-executive
officers, judges, and lawyers-be granted an inevitable measure of
discretion, sometimes more, sometimes less, but always and everywhere
some.51 The necessity of conferring discretion on law's agents, in turn,
requires that these agents embody a particular kind of moral virtue, what
the classics called "practical judgment," or phronesis. Written laws are
never self-executing; their authors always address them to some actual
agent or other, and that agent must, within more or less wide parameters,
exercise practical judgment in order to comply properly with the law's
mandate. The legal assessment of their actions, accordingly, is not
limited to "legal" or "illegal"; it includes, much more subtly, issues of
how well their chosen course advances law's implicit or explicit
purpose, as compared in that regard to other available, and equally legal,
courses. We can, therefore, comfortably ask, in a strictly legal sense, not
only whether Vere acted legally or illegally, but also whether he acted
well or best. The law does not consist of two poles, the forbidden and the
required; it more typically runs, rather, through a spectrum, sometimes
quite wide, between those poles.
The necessity of discretion in legal action raises a third point often
missed by legally unsophisticated readers of Billy Budd, a point we
might call the scope of the law. At the most basic level, these critics
sometimes imply that the realm of the legal is to be confined to "cases"
being investigated or tried. Thus, for example, Johnson speaks of
Captain Vere's decision to deal with Billy Budd "legally" when he
decided to call the drumhead court, as opposed to "essentially," some
other, non-legal but not illegal, way. But, in exercising his wide
discretion in handling the situation, in deciding whether to prosecute it
before a drumhead court or refer it to the admiralty, Vere was acting
equally legally. It is correct to say, as Johnson says, that his choice of
"framing" determines the outcome; it is wrong, however, to think that
alternative framings, within the context of the legal system, might not
have produced a very different, and much more acceptable, outcome.
50. POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATURE, supra note 199, at 171; cf. WEINER, supra note 36, at
145 ("Thus the character of Captain Vere emphasizes well-defined features of a legalistic
mentality.").
51. See Lawry, supra note 22 at 173-74; see also Solove, supra note 21, at 2457 ("Ironically,
the law fails in Billy Budd not because it is uncompromisingly strict, but because it can be readily
manipulated by Vere."). Knowing that law involves discretionary judgments does not, of course,
ensure that one will exercise one's discretion well. See infra Part IIA.2.
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Law, to say it bluntly, is bigger than non-lawyers, even those who are
literary scholars, sometimes realize.
It is important, at this point, to see that, within the scope of the
strictly legal, there are questions of two distinct, though intimately
related, orders. On the one hand, legality poses strictly descriptive
questions: What does the law require or forbid in this context? Similarly,
but, as we have seen, more subtly: What is the permitted range of
discretion here? What does the law not only allow, but encourage or
expect? On the other hand, legality poses normative questions: Was a
particular action in compliance with law, was it not just "subject to law,"
within the realm of the law, but was it also in conformity with the law?
And, as we have seen, this latter question often admits of degrees,
although our ordinary legal vocabulary is surprisingly impoverished in
the terms it affords us for those degrees. We can thus sensibly say that
an officer of the law exercised his or her discretion well or badly, not
just legally or illegally, even as we can say that a statute is well or poorly
drafted, or a judge's opinion well or poorly reasoned. In all these cases,
the basis of the assessment is accomplishment of the purpose of the law;
legal evaluation, in these cases, involves an assessment of whether the
means to law's ends are well-formed, or well-used, or well-judged. To
ask, beyond that, normative questions about the ends of law themselves,
is to move beyond legality, strictly conceived.
b. The Justice of Vere's Conduct
We have just seen that, to answer important questions that Billy
Budd raises about law and legality, we must bring to bear on its analysis
a fairly robust understanding of law. That understanding must show us,
not merely what the requirements of law are at any particular time, but
also what social ordering tasks law may plausibly be expected to
perform, and how law necessarily, or at least typically, goes about those
tasks, and how well its agents perform those tasks. But, having seen
those possibilities and methodologies and their assessment under strictly
legal norms, we are faced with another, very different, question-
indeed, with a very different kind of question: What tasks should we ask
law to do (and how should we ask law to do them)?52 What social
52. This and the other parenthetical are meant to acknowledge, as unobtrusively as possible,
that questions of justice may be procedural as well as substantive; justice, as classically understood,
involves law's means as well as its ends, and the two are famously difficult to distinguish in all but
paradigmatic cases. Sometimes, significantly, law's procedures are ends in themselves, or very
nearly so. See generally Rob Atkinson, The Reformed Welfare State as the Radical Humanist
Republic: An Enthusiastic (If Qualified) Endorsement of Matthew Adler's Beyond Efficiency and
Procedure, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 339 (2000). Thus, for example, one could object that Vere's
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ordering outcomes should we prefer (and what processes to achieve
them)? Questions about the law's capabilities, what the law can do, of
course, are descriptive questions; questions about how well law's agents
advance law's purposes, as we saw in the last section, are normative
questions, although normative in a strictly legal sense. By contrast,
questions about what the law should be used to do (and how it should be
used), are normative questions of a very different order. They are, in a
word, questions of justice.
Thus, at this point, legal analysis, like literary criticism, is pressed
beyond a narrow understanding of itself. If we are to answer these latter
questions, we must have, not just a theory of law, but at least a
preliminary theory of justice. What's more, as we shall see in Part III,
the novella presses us to the conclusion that, for law's agents to act
justly, they themselves must have both. Kings' agents, as well as kings
themselves, must be philosophers.
c. The Sanity of Vere's Conduct
The two questions we have just considered-the legality of Vere's
actions and the justice of the law under which he acted-are only
implicitly raised in the text itself. We cannot seriously read the text
without addressing those questions, but the text itself does not directly
demand that we answer them. With respect to a third question, by
contrast, the text, through Melville's narrator, is quite explicit: "Whether
Captain Vere . .. was really the sudden victim of any degree of
aberration, everyone must determine for himself by such light as this
narrative may afford."5 Each of us must, the narrator insists, answer this
question. And, in making our determination, we are told, both directly
and indirectly, what materials to use, and what not to use: this narrative
(and the other narratives it commends to us) and not other sources,
especially not the insights of social science.
Here, then, is a trilateral interdisciplinary intersection where law,
literature, and social science all meet. Melville's narrator asks us to
assess Vere's sanity, in full knowledge of the fact that such assessments
are inevitable for both lawyers and others living under the law. Yet, he
explicitly calls us outside the law as the source of our assessment, and he
implicitly forbids us to look to the insights of social science. As we shall
see, the call of law to look outside itself, to imaginative literature, is
decision to try Billy before a drumhead court was not only a poor exercise of his legally allowed
discretion, but also a denial to Billy of his right, in law and in justice, to a fuller, "fairer" trial. That
said, for present purposes, these qualification can be left aside, for later elaboration.
53. BrLLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 102.
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essential to the effectiveness of the message. But closing the door on the
insights of social science, I shall argue, is not essential, but rather
dangerous. It is understandable, in light of the dubious social science of
his day, that Melville would urge closing this door. But that condition
has certainly improved since his time. Understanding why this dubious
move did not damage Melville's novel will reveal something critically
important about both the narrative itself and us as its readers.
C. Toward a New Substantive and Interdisciplinary Synthesis
It is often said that law needs literature to give it a sense of
narrative, to put flesh on the bones, to develop sensitivity to the needs of
real people. That is quite so, or at least so I myself have conceded, and
don't care to debate here. What we need to see here is rather the opposite
point: For literature to fulfill its own destiny-unless that destiny is to be
a small one-it needs law. The larger role I have in mind is the role
Plato outlined in Books II, III, and X of the Republic, nothing short of
training philosopher-kings.54 As we have seen in this Part, the claims of
both literary and legal scholars about Billy Budd take them beyond the
confines of their disciplines, narrowly defined. This is, moreover, a step
Melville invites them to take, sometimes quite explicitly.
So, we shall see in the next two Parts, it is with my own substantive
assessments. In Part III, we cannot make the necessary assessments of
Vere's character unless we can make subtle distinctions that are, strictly
speaking, legal." And these assessments, in their turn, press us toward
the interdisciplinary realignments I suggest in Part IV. 5 6 To make these
substantive assessments, I myself have to make certain normative
judgments; in particular, I have to opt for ranking life above truth, at
least in cases like Billy Budd's. From one perspective, these judgments
take me outside my own particular province, law. But, from another
perspective, they tend to confirm the importance of a broader
understanding of what law is, and how it is necessarily related to other
disciplines. If I am right about Vere as a flawed role model, then the way
to avert his fatal flaw is to do the reading he omitted, with a fuller
understanding of law, justice, and literature.
54. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO bks. H, III, X, at 35, 63, 277 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic
Books 2d ed. 1991) (c. 380 B.C.E.) [hereinafter PLATO] (grappling with, throughout the dialogue,
the seemingly inextricable entanglement between poetry and politics).
55. See infra Part I1.
56. See infra Part IV.
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III. AVERTING THE VERE VEER: SAVING BILLY BUDD WHILE SERVING
THE LAW
This Part explores an alternative substantive reading of Billy Budd.
The first section focuses on the microcosm of the ship under Captain
Vere's command.57 It offers a reading that vindicates the law and indicts
a particular aspect of Vere's character, his odd, almost certainly
neurotic, tendency to associate the normatively right course of action,
legally and morally, with the personally painful, psychologically if not
physically. But for this character flaw, Vere might well have used his
subtle understanding of law's flexibility both to save Billy Budd and to
avoid any real risk of mutiny. Taking this position places me, as I have
said, between the traditionalists and the revisionists, but in a particular
way. I find the law here, for all its apparent harshness, eminently
workable; I find fault with Vere not because he followed the law to its
supposedly inevitable, unjust conclusion, but because he failed to see its
real, present potential for justice. And he failed, not because his
intellectual understanding of law was inadequate, but because his
character was badly formed-badly formed in a way that better
education, particularly proper reading, might have fixed.
The second section of this Part extrapolates that vindication of the
law and indictment of Vere's character flaw to the macrocosmic scale.8
On this view, the traditional God of Christianity shares Vere's basic
character flaw. Christianity's God, like Captain Vere, is unnecessarily,
even neurotically, hard on himself, with awful consequences for himself
and others, particularly his "only begotten Son." On this reading, a
properly republican law, the one Vere might have followed had he been
a healthier, less "godly" human, is poised to replace a fundamentally
flawed God as the ideal ordering force in the universe.
This twin analysis, microcosmic and macrocosmic, prepares us for
the Article's final part, which shows how Billy Budd would have us
answer questions, as old as Plato and the Prophets, about how human
affairs can and should be ordered, and what role law and literature can
and must play in that ordering.
A. In the Microcosm of the Ship
Melville does a marvelously balanced job of showing us first
Vere's character, then how his tragic action emerges from it. Quite
significantly, he shows Vere to be an extraordinarily able sea officer, at a
57. See infra Part HI.A.
58. See infra Part IB.
2019] 1159
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
time when England's naval officers were the bulwark of the Anglo-
American system of ordered liberty. The "rule of law," against a France
just emerged from Revolutionary Terror and poised to plunge into
Napoleonic megalomania. It is only against that background that we see
the significance of Vere's handling of Billy Budd's case. For the most
part, he shows himself to be an exceptionally skillful leader and a very
subtle, if self-taught, student of law. His problem is not his general
attitude toward the law, nor even in its particular applications. It is,
rather, in the havoc wreaked when his peculiar tropism causes him,
metaphorically, to "veer" from his usually balanced, well-trimmed
course. If we follow Melville's lead carefully, we can locate precisely
the point at which Vere turned from this course. What is more, we can
reconstruct that course itself from very clear textual clues. That course
shows us a way to achieve justice in this situation and leaves us to
ponder why Vere was unable to do it.
We need first to look at Vere's character, his habituated ways of
dealing with critical questions, then at how that character worked itself
out in the particulars of Billy Budd's case.5 9 Against that background,
we will then step back to consider how the text suggests an alternative,
much superior, handling of the case. Finally, we will examine what the
novel has to tell us about the kind of person Vere had to be to miss such
an opportunity in the law.
1. Vere's General Character: Exemplary "Officer and Gentleman"
In two closely linked chapters, six and seven,60 Melville's narrator
shows Vere to be very nearly the paragon of the "officer and gentleman"
that has given that quaint old phrase its continued, if paled, appeal down
to the present day. Chapter six begins by focusing on the centrality of
ship commanders' leadership: "In their general bearing and conduct the
commissioned officers of a warship naturally take their tone from the
commander, that is, if he have that ascendancy of character that ought to
be his." 6 1 The rest of the chapter shows Vere to have the makings of just
that sort of commander.
Thus, the narrator tells us, Vere was "a sailor of distinction even in
a time prolific of renowned seamen."6 2 "He had seen much service, been
59. As Johnson has shown, the interplay between character and action runs deeply through
plot of the whole novella and each of its three principal characters, Billy Budd, Claggart, and Vere;
"It is this discrepancy between character and action that gives rise to critical disagreement about the
story: readers tend either to save the plot and condemn Billy . . ., or to save Billy and condemn the
plot . . . ." JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 82.
60. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 16-19.
61. Id.at 16.
62. Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, Comment on Richard Weisberg's Interpretation of Billy
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in various engagements, always acquitting himself as an officer mindful
of the welfare of his men, but never tolerating an infraction of discipline;
thoroughly versed in the science of his profession, and intrepid to the
verge of temerity, though never injudiciously so."63
Yet these "official" attributes do not exhaust his character: Vere
had significant features not directly attributable to his career, features
that were not, strictly speaking, occupational. "Aside from his qualities
as a sea officer Captain Vere was an exceptional character. Unlike no
few of England's renowned sailors, long and arduous service, with
signal devotion to it, had not resulted in absorbing and salting the entire
man."64 These features, on first face and to an unsophisticated eye, seem
at odds with his office; on deeper inspection, however, they prove
entirely consistent with it, even essential to it; they are not merely
appropriate ornaments, but basic components. They show us why it was
important, then and perhaps now, for an officer to be a gentle-person, by
showing us what it means to be a gentle-person, a genuine aristocrat, in a
properly functioning meritocracy, as opposed to a merely
hereditary "squirearchy."
Foremost among these exceptional features was Vere's "marked
leaning toward everything intellectual."65 The relationship between his
love of books and his more strictly technical work was complex. On the
one hand, his studiousness affected his perspective on both the details of
his craft and the larger purpose that his craft served-both the tactical
and the strategic, we could say. As to the tactical, "in illustrating of any
point touching the stirring personages and events of the time he would
be as apt to cite some historic character or incident of antiquity as he
would to cite from the moderns."66 As to the strategic, "[i]n this line of
reading he found confirmation of his own more reserved thoughts ... so
that, as touching most fundamental topics, there had got to be
established in him some positive convictions, which he forefelt would
abide in him essentially unmodified so long as his intelligent part
remained unimpaired."6 7
On these latter, strategic matters, Vere favored as commentators
"unconventional writers.. . who, free from cant and convention,
honestly and in the spirit of common sense philosophise upon
Budd, 1 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 71, 75 (1989) [hereinafter Posner, Comment] ("The
novella presents Vere to the reader with high accolades .....
63. MELVILLE,BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 16.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 19.
67. Id. at 18.
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realities."68 They confirmed his conservativism, his favoring the
traditionalist English cause over the revolutionary French. The strong
implication is that he read both Paine and Burke, and, after a careful
weighing of the two, sided with the latter. His commitment to the
English cause was not jingoism, not even a merely reflexive patriotism.
As illustrative of the writers he preferred, the narrator gives the French
essayist Montaigne.69 The touchstone of his preference was excellence,
not nationality. And his measure of excellence, significantly, was the
public good-literally "res publica," the foundation, philosophically and
etymologically, of "republic."
Unlike many of his less studied colleagues, he was not conservative
out of self-interest. Rather, he put aside general class interest; even
more, he wholly shunned narrow personal interest. Indeed, as we shall
see, the excess of this last virtue became his tragic flaw, if not his
besetting sin. It was his settled conviction, based on his careful reading,
that radicalism of the French fashion could not be contained in
sustainable forms:
While other members of that aristocracy to which by birth he belonged
were incensed at the innovators mainly because their theories were
inimical to the privileged classes, Captain Vere disinterestedly opposed
them not alone because they seemed to be insusceptible of
embodiment in lasting institutions, but at war with the peace of the
world and the true welfare of mankind.7 0
Quite significantly, then, Vere's was a contingent conservatism. By
easy negative implication, if he could be convinced that alternative
social arrangements, better for "the true welfare of mankind," could
succeed, then he would accede to them, even support them. This made
him something of a paradoxical conservative, very firmly in the position
of his aristocratic ancestors. They were of the highest and oldest Norman
nobility, but they made their name in the vanguard of prototypically
revolutionary causes. The most illustrious Vere, the narrator reminds us,
made his name in the Protestant cause in the German wars of the early
seventeenth century. In the English Civil war, the narrator expects us to
know, Vere's people took the side of the Parliament against the king;
they cast their lot with the Commonwealth, literally, the common good.
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was the general commander of the Parliamentary army that defeated the
royalist forces in the first phase of the English Civil War.72
Yet, like his namesake, Fairfax balked at regicide and, apparently,
republicanism. Perhaps like Vere, he did not believe that such radical
principles, putatively in the public interest, could be embodied in
permanent institutions. Tragically, his conservatism proved correct;
whether as a self-fulfilling prophesy, we cannot, of course, ever know.
Fairfax retired from the service rather than countenance regicide;
command of the army, and later the country, passed to his lieutenant,
Oliver Cromwell. Fairfax never reconciled with this old comrade-in-
arms; the Commonwealth gave way to Cromwell's Protectorate, a kind
of neo-classical dictatorship, which itself collapsed shortly after
Cromwell's death.73 Perhaps the republican experiment asked too much,
too soon; perhaps it needed only the continued support of men like
Fairfax to succeed.
In any case, a chastened monarchy was restored under the executed
king's much savvier son;74 after him, his reactionary brother's brief reign
precipitated the paradigmatically English "Glorious Revolution": the
constitutional establishment of a limited monarchy, the political and
social entrenchment of a hereditary "squirearchy," and the economic
unleashing of an amazingly successful, and upwardly mobile, merchant
and eventually manufacturing class.75 England became the imperial
power that dominated world trade and manufacturing at the threshold of
the nineteenth century. And, of course, its navy was the principal
bulwark against both the radicalism of the late Republic and Napoleon's
imperial ambitions, "a fleet, the right arm of a Power then all but the sole
free conservative one of the Old World." 7 6
It was near the height of this oddly mixed regime, in the midst of
this anomalous amalgamation of inherited position and reward of talent,
that Melville's Vere made his career. As the narrator tell us, "[t]hough
allied to the higher nobility his advancement had not been altogether
owing to influences connected with that circumstance."7 Vere was born
high and earned his way up.
Vere's noble name, like his "officer and gentleman" status, has
several related dualities. As my title indicates, there is the unmistakable
72. See generally Joseph Leondar Schneider, Melville's Use of the Vere-Fairfax Lineage in
Billy Budd, 26 J. ONOMASTICS 129, 129-38 (1978).
73. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION: 1603-1714, 111-18 (Christopher
Brooke et al. eds., 1961) (narrating events from 1640-1660).
74. Id. at 193-99 (narrating events from 1660-1688).
75. Id. at 257-61 (narrating events from 1688-1714).
76. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 12.
77. Id. at 16.
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pun of "Vere" with "veer." We shall explore that in more detail later,
against the background of the particular incident where Vere's fatal
"veer" occurs. We have seen already the aristocratic and revolutionary
heritage of the Fairfax-Vere family. We need now to see a critical
duality in Captain Vere's nickname, "Starry." As the narrator tells us, it
was a Fairfax cousin who conferred it upon him in congratulation, after
Vere's role in a major naval victory.7 8 That cousin had been re-reading
Andrew Marvell's poem Appleton House, written about Marvell's pupil,
the niece of the great General Fairfax, when Marvell was himself the
father's prot6g6, before he went on to become special aid to Milton,
Cromwell's virtual secretary of state. In the critical passage, Marvell
alludes favorably to "the discipline severe"-perhaps another pun on
Vere, by both Marvell and Melville-"of Fairfax and the starry Vere."so
"Starry," in that connection, means primarily, if not exclusively,
"stellar," "of the highest order of excellence"-in a word, a star. And so,
surely, Captain Vere's cousin meant "starry" to apply to him. He called
him that on the heels of a major military success, a success of the kind to
remind the two of them, and all their peers, of their illustrious
Vere ancestors.
But Melville neatly balances this positive association, as he does
much else he says positive about Vere, with curious qualifications. First,
and most obviously, he has the nickname taken up by those of Vere's
peers who do not appreciate his finer, more "genteel" qualities. Chief
among these qualities, and closely aligned with his essential
studiousness, is a tendency toward abstraction in thought and aloofness
in conduct. Lesser officers, even those who appreciated his successes,
did not fully understand the source of these qualities, their rootedness in
the truly aristocratic elements of his character. That character perplexed,
and to some extent alienated, those of lesser ability, even as they
admired Vere and compared him favorably with Nelson: "Vere is a
noble fellow, Starry Vere. Spite the gazettes, Sir Horatio . . . is at
bottom scarse a better seaman or fighter. But between you and me now
do'nt you think there is a queer streak of the pedantic running
through him?"81
For these sympathetic but uncomprehending colleagues, "starry"
was "starry-eyed"; even as they juxtapose "noble" and "starry," they fail
to see their essential connection. They see "starry" as a qualification of,
78. Id.at 17.
79. 1 NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1287, 1302-03 (M.H. Abrams, et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1974).
80. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 17.
81. Id. at 19.
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and detraction from, "noble," rather than a compliment to it, even
component of it. What's more, and closely associated with this
perception of Vere's "abstraction," was that lesser officers also found
him at least a little aloof and humorless;82 this, as we shall see,
doubtlessly affected their perception of his conduct in the particular case
of Billy Budd.8 3
Melville counterbalances this "popular" doubt with the suggestion
that Vere's abstraction is very much the part of "higher" natures. His
narrator concedes that "Captain Vere, though practical enough upon
occasion, would at times betray a certain dreaminess of mood."8 4 But he
goes on to suggest that this befits the best of minds: "As with some
others engaged in various departments of the world's more heroic
activities . . . ."85 His intellectualism is part and parcel of his larger
character; like this part, Vere's character as a whole works in complex
synergy with his official role as a naval officer. That synergy is the core
of classical virtue: that condition of a person or thing in which it best
performs its essential function.86
The narrator strikes a similarly precise balance between the popular
and the informed understanding of Vere with respect to a related aspect
of his character, his distinctly diplomatic, non-military bearing when off-
duty. On the one hand, this seems at odds with his official status, but
only to the uninitiated, those who are not even in the military
themselves, much less naval officers: "Any landsman observing this
gentleman . .. might have taken him for the King's guest, a civilian
aboard the King's-ship, some highly honorable discreet envoy on his
way to an important post."87 When "nothing demanded his paramount
82. They "found him lacking in the companionable quality, a dry and bookish gentleman as
they deemed." Id. at 18. They thought he "evinced little appreciation of mere humor" and was
"grave in his bearing." Id. at 16. See also Solove, supra note 21, at 2466 ("In all descriptions of
Vere, his only fault seems to be a bit of remoteness.").
83. Vere, for his part, seemed oblivious to the opinions of these lesser lights, perhaps like
Socrates and "the many." "He seemed unmindful of the circumstance that to his bluff company such
remote allusions however pertinent they might really be were altogether alien . . . . But
considerateness in such matters is not easy to natures constituted like Captain Vere's. Their honesty
prescribes to them directness, sometimes far-reaching . . . ." MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1,
at 19. And yet, if he could not see how they misperceived his "abstraction," he carefully takes
account of his fellows' lack of abstraction in his argument to the drumhead court.
84. Id. at 17.
85. Id.
86. PLATO, supra note 54, bk. I, at 32 ("[Dloes there seem to you also to be a virtue for each
thing to which some work is assigned?"); see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACTEAN ETHICS bk. II, at 41
(Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (c. 384 B.C.E.) [Hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS] ("[E]very virtue
or excellence (1) renders good the thing itself of which it is the excellence, and (2) causes it to
perform its function well.").
87. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 17.
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action, he was the most undemonstrative of men."88 On the other hand,
the narrator suggests that, from the perspective of the truly knowing, the
reason for Vere's demeanor might be quite different, deeply rooted in
the "gentlemanly" complement to his "officer" position: "But in fact this
unobtrusiveness of demeanor may have proceeded from a certain
unaffected modesty of manhood sometimes accompanying a resolute
nature, a modesty evinced at all times not calling for pronounced action,
and which shown in any rank of life suggests a virtue aristocratic in
kind."89 As the words placed in italics indicate, the narrator offers this
observation in a tantalizing tentative conditional mode; Vere's character
may be-but cannot yet definitively said to be-genuinely aristocratic,
truly part of the rule of the "best."
In a similar vein, almost but not quite taking away what he is just
about to give, Melville has his narrator raise this critical qualification,
even as he introduces the appellation "Starry Vere": "How such a
designation happened to fall upon one who whatever his sterling
qualities was without any brilliant ones. .. ."90 What are we to make of
the narrator's ambivalence about the "excellence" of Vere's character,
the normative assessment of the descriptive features that lie behind it?
Some have said that it is part of a careful effort to show Vere in a
disadvantageous light, overshadowed by the more illustrious Nelson.91
Others have pointed out that, at the time of the story, before even his
victory at the Nile, Nelson himself was yet a great way from his own
apotheosis at Trafalgar. Indeed, had Vere not died shortly after Billy
Budd, he might himself have become a Nelson.92
For purposes of my analysis, it is important to see an even more
plausible alternative, an intermediate between these two. Vere, on this
view, was admittedly no Nelson, no charismatic, sport-of-nature naval
genius. But we are not to think less of him on account of that. Some, the
narrator reminds us, thought that Nelson's boldness, even bravado got
him killed and that his premature death interfered with orders that might
have made the victory at Trafalgar both more complete and less costly.9 3
Vere was a very different but equally essential sort of character, less
88. Id. at 16-17.
89. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND
LITERATURE 106 (1992) [hereinafter WEISBERG POETHICS] ("Vere's colleague and rival, Admiral
Horatio Nelson").
92. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 169 ("It is true that Vere is no Nelson,
but neither was Nelson in 1797 .... ); see also Lawry, supra note 22, at 183 ("But Vere was not a
Nelson."); Posner, Comment, supra note 62, at 80 n.13.
93. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 14.
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brilliant but more steady, far more in the common run of military
officers, but at least equally important for exactly that reason. The
successful operation of the navy required just such men as Vere, in much
larger numbers than its Nelsons. Vere's form of excellence is accessible
to all holders of his office, not just a tiny minority. In all these respects,
he is something of a philosopher-king in his own little microcosmic
shipboard commonwealth. He was a creature, not of genius, but of
reason, and a particularly important kind of reason, in both classical
philosophy and law: Aristotle's phronesis or "practical wisdom,94 our
"practical reason," "contextual judgment," or "prudentialism."95
On this view, Melville is tentative about Vere's character because
he wants us to judge it, at least in large part, by his conduct in the
particular case he is about to decide, the specific test he himself must
soon take. Melville gives us the general standard of excellence, captainly
virtue; we ourselves must decide whether, in Vere's great personal test,
he measures up, is truly excellent. For classical morality, virtue is not an
abstract, absolute state. Rather, as we have seen, it is the condition of a
thing in its proper use: sharpness in a knife, speed in a horse, proper "job
performance" in a human being.9 6 To see if Vere is virtuous, we must
see him at his work, and at a particularly challenging point in that work.
That challenge, Melville is careful to tell us, came to Vere precisely
because of his. character, his particular embodiment of the relevant
military virtues. It was precisely this combination of qualities-not
merely officer and gentleman, but also better officer because superior
gentleman-that caused Vere to be put to his test: "probably . .. the
character of her commander, it was thought, specially adapted him for
any duty where under unforeseen difficulties a prompt initiative might
have to be taken in some matter demanding knowledge and ability in
addition to those qualities implied in good seamanship."97 Thus was
Vere's vessel dispatched to pursue an enemy frigate.98 At exactly that
94. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 86, bk. II, at 40. For a definition of phronesis see
Ostwald's glossary in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 86, at 312.
95. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 86-87 (1993); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 170-71
(1988); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 21-25
(1998) [hereinafter SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE].
96. See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 86, bk. II, at 41.
97. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 40; cf. SPANOS, supra note 21, at 88 (narrator's
account of Vere's character and career "suggests ... that, however intelligent, well read, and well-
meaning he is, Captain Vere's decisions as a naval officer are not those of a free agent, but are
ultimately determined by a hegemonic discourse that he has deeply internalized.").
98. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 40.
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critical juncture, Claggart makes his false but fatal accusation against
Billy Budd.
2. Captain Vere's "Veer" in Billy Budd's Case
We have just seen that Vere generally acquits himself quite well as
both an officer and a gentleman. The real question about Vere comes up
in his handling of Billy Budd's case. As the narrator puts it, that question
is "[w]hether Captain Vere . . .was really the sudden victim of any
degree of aberration;"99 whether he was "not mad indeed, but yet not
quite unaffected in his intellects.""oo
On the evidence the narrator presents, the answer to his questions,
leading as they are, is emphatically yes. Vere is not "mad" in any
general sense; as we have just seen, he was almost the opposite, a model
of measured discretion. But he handled this case very badly, because he
has a serious character flaw, a radically skewing tropism, a severe
tendency, under just the right circumstances, to "veer." The challenge to
us as readers is to identify exactly the point and nature of his departure, a
matter that, according to the narrator, "one must determine for himself
by such light as this narrative may afford." 0' At precisely the point
where a call for subtle judgment implicates his own personal interest, he
"veers" toward what harms him the most, is the most painful to him. In
this section, then, we must discover the precise point at which Vere
"veered" in the wrong direction, took and the wrong tack.
A more apt nautical metaphor is implicit in the very name "Vere."
A "veer," in the nautical parlance of the Napoleonic era, is what is more
commonly today called a "jibe." It is the opposite of the relatively safe
and easy "change of tack," a change of direction when sailing into the
wind; it is the always dangerous change of course when the wind is with
you, at your back.102 To change directions radically when things are
going your way, to be inclined to make that dangerous maneuver in just
those favorable circumstances, is precisely the Vere "veer." In the third
section of this Part, we will see what other "course" he might have
taken, a course more in keeping with his general character and the
99. Id. at 49.
100. Id. at 48; see also Solove, supra note 21, at 2469-70 ("This is the stark message of Billy
Budd-that despite the manifest virtues of leaders such as Vere, despite all the outward
appearances, we may be failing to peer beneath the veneer.") (citation omitted).
101. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 49.
102. According to the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1419,
1451 (1976), to "vere" is "[t]o change the direction of a ship by turning away from the direction of
the wind; wear ship"; to "wear ship" is "[t]o make (a sailing ship) come about with the wind
aft .. .[t]o come about with the stern to windward."
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demands of Billy's particular case.103 In the final section of this Part, we
will examine why he did not take that course. Now we must examine, in
some detail, the wrong turn, the veer, he actually made.
At every point in the unfolding of the case, Melville perfectly
counterposes the evidence of Vere's state of mind: cautiousness on the
one hand, expeditiousness on the other. We need to examine Vere's state
of mind at each critical phase of decision-making: his initial handling of
Claggart's accusation, his interrogations of Claggart and Billy Budd, his
reaction to Billy Budd's killing of Claggart, his decision to call a
drumhead court, his argument to the tribunal, and his final "audience"
alone with the condemned Billy. Melville shows us that the attention of
Vere's fellow officers was focused on his decision to call the tribunal
and then to press that tribunal toward a conviction. He poses the critical
question of Vere's sanity just after the calling of the tribunal, right at the
outset of the trial.
But to us, his readers, he points in two directions, forward and
backward, with the reference to "such light as this narrative may
afford."l 04 Critical elements-structural and substantive parallels-all
implicitly ask us to question a logically and chronologically prior
decision: whether to reveal beyond the circle of original witnesses,
himself and Billy, what actually befell Claggart. Vere decides to proceed
publicly, making of the matter a formal, legal "case." Had he decided to
do otherwise, we shall see, the fatal chain of events need not have been
set in motion. Taking this alternative course would have involved
straining, if not breaking, the letter of the law, but in a way that would
much more effectively have served its spirit.
As we saw in Part II, the demand for just this sort of decision is
precisely what positions of legal authority frequently, even
paradigmatically, place upon their holders."o' This is particularly
problematic in light of what the narrative shows us about the nature of a
very wide range of legal activity. More basically, many legal decisions
are committed to the sound discretion of the law's agents; nowhere is
this more so than in the military, in time of war.06 These decisions are
virtually unreviewable in a court of law, but not, as we have seen,
unreviewable as a matter of legal norms, even narrowly conceived. We
can plausibly say that Vere's actions were not subject to legal sanction,
even as we say that they were not up to the highest standard the law
103. See infra Part III.A.3.
104. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 49.
105. See supra Part I.
106. See Posner, Comment, supra note 62, at 78 (execution as "justifiable"); id. at 79 (noting
that "distasteful" legal outcomes may nonetheless be "permissible" choices under relevant law).
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itself holds up for its agents as the measure of how well they have
advanced law's own ends. The need for sound judgment in such
situations is especially heightened here; what the situation called for in a
commander were "two qualities not readily interfusable-prudence and
rigor." 07 Vere's tragedy lay in exercising that discretion poorly, more
specifically, with unnecessary severity. At every point, Melville shows
Vere's actions to be perfectly poised between these two
demands,'"except where his own "interests" entered the picture and
skewed his decision.
Billy Budd's case is but an especially crucial example of the
requirement of such judgment. This was because, to use Melville's
carefully chosen term, this case was "crucial,"109 in multiple meanings of
that word, ways that heighten the need for administrative virtues and cast
into higher relief the egregiousness of Vere's lapse-or the severity of
his "veer." The total effect is to suggest how much better things would
have gone had the two critically parallel lines of ministerial character,
prudence and rigor, never been allowed to cross. Much better if the
dilemma had been avoided, the crucifixion averted.
As the narrator points out, there was a "crossing over" of guilt and
innocence; Billy Budd's moral innocence becomes legal guilt."10 And
the more clear the real innocence, the "worse for the responsibility of a
loyal sea-commander inasmuch as he was not authorised to determine
the matter on that primitive basis.""' The stress of that responsibility
itself would be excruciating, literally, like being crucified. And, of
course, Billy Budd's case was "crucial" in the more general sense of
being very important. Life and death turned on very finely
calibrated considerations.
We need, then, to descend to a fairly detailed analysis of the crisis
Vere faced; we need to look closely, at each critical phase of decision-
making, at both Vere's state of mind and his outward conduct. In what
follows, we begin with Vere's interrogations of Claggart and Billy Budd
and continue through his decision to make a formal "case" out of the
accidental killing, his constituting of the tribunal, and his argument to
the tribunal down to his pronouncement of final, fatal sentence. That
analysis will show us how well he handled the case right up to his tragic
107. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 49.
108. See Lawry, supra note 22, at 175 ("Melville's characteristic ambiguity is at work here....
What is significant is that it would not be unreasonable for the Captain, to think that mutiny aboard
the Bellipotent was a real possibility.").
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"veer," and how inexorably badly-but not illegally-events went
after that.
a. Vere's Handling of Claggart's False Accusation
Vere handles the first phase of the case, Claggart's initial
accusation of Billy Budd, with unimpeachable deftness. His a sessment
of their respective characters is perfectly astute, and his spontaneous
choice of procedures is impeccably savvy. Any errors in his judgment
here are minor; they escape notice, much less censure, from all but the
most unforgivingly harsh hindsight.
From the very outset, Vere is extremely suspicious of Claggart, as
well he should have been. The narrator gives ample evidence that Vere's
suspicions were grounded in prior contacts with him and in accurate
intuitions about his character. When Claggart first approached him with
accusations, before Claggart had said a single word, Vere's expression
showed something like "a vaguely repellent distaste." 12 He quickly
recovered "much of his wonted official manner," except "a sort of
impatience" in bidding Claggart to speak.13 But, as Claggart did speak,
Vere's "aspect changed into restiveness under something in the
testifier's manner in giving his testimony."1 14 Vere had recalled an
earlier misgiving about Claggart: "upon a prior occasion the patriotic
zeal officially evinced by Claggart had somewhat irritated him as
appearing rather supersensible and strained.""' And that, in turn,
reminded him of a parallel case in his earlier service: "Furthermore,
something even in the official's self-possessed and somewhat
ostentatious manner in making the specifications strangely reminded him
of a bandsman, a perjurous witness in a capital case before a court-
martial ashore of which, when a lieutenant, Captain Vere, had been
a member."'1 6
On the other hand, Vere was extremely well disposed toward Billy
Budd-again, on good evidence, rightly perceived from the beginning.
When first impressed into the navy, Billy bid farewell to his old
merchant ship with a jaunty but ambiguous "[a]nd good-bye to you, too,
old Rights-of-Man.""' The subordinate officer in charge took this as
something approaching insubordination, as did Vere upon hearing that
officer's report. But the narrator assures us that Billy was incapable of
112. Id. at 41.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 42.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 7.
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any such subtlety or "satiric sally,"1 '8 and Vere himself interpreted
Billy's parting salute to the merchant vessel favorably, even generously,
"admiring the spirit that could take an arbitrary enlistment so merrily
and sensibly."119 Billy's performance once aboard so thoroughly
confirmed Vere's initial impression that he had resolved to have him
promoted to command of a sail-top nearer his own inspection. And his
pre-disposition toward Billy was not only, in the strictest sense,
professional; it was aesthetic, perhaps even a bit erotic, as well. Upon
first seeing Billy after his impressment, Vere congratulated the officer
who found him for "his good fortune in lighting on such a fine specimen
of the genus homo, who in the nude might have posed for a statue of
young Adam before the Fall."l 20
Accordingly, upon hearing the dubious Claggart's accusation
against the spotless Billy, Vere shows "unfeigned astonishment."2' He
was, at first, short with Claggart himself, giving outward and active play
to his internal analysis and doubts. Put off by Claggart's circumlocution
in referring to impressed sailors, Vere impatiently interrupts with "[b]e
direct, man; say impressed men." 22 Even more put off by Claggart's
allusion to the recent Nore mutiny, he interrupted more heatedly,
"[n]ever mind that," displaying at least a measure of anger at the thought
that Claggart had meant to alarm him as to his own personal safety.23
Mindful of an earlier perjury case, Vere put Claggart on notice: Perjury
in capital offenses is itself a capital offense. In sum, the narrator makes
quite clear that Vere, true to his character, sized the men up accurately,
and hesitated only about how to proceed most wisely.124
b. Vere's Initial Investigation of Claggart's Charge
Although reflective and careful in deciding how to proceed, he was
both quick and effective in his decision. The steps he took here are very
significant, especially by way of contrast with what he does after the
assault. "At first indeed he was naturally"' 2 5 in support of having
Claggart bring forward his informants. But, as the narrator says, "such a
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"in the present stage of it, he thought, might undesirably affect the ship's
company."l2 7 Thus he overrode his initial, natural inclination with an
almost instantaneous, but nonetheless thoughtful response, based on
apparently correct perceptions of the inevitable consequence, word
getting out, and a reasonable assessment of the relevant risks, unsettling
the crew in the course of a delicate and dangerous military engagement.
The alternative procedure he immediately hit upon was no less
clever and effective for all its near spontaneity. He would test the
credibility of the accused and the accuser: If Claggart proved incredible
to Vere himself, that would end the matter. To achieve this, Vere needed
to change the scene from public to private, from above decks to below,
and to bring Billy Budd in without alerting anyone, including Billy
himself, of the purpose of the meeting. To achieve this, Vere actively
and explicitly enlisted his "cabin boy" in concealing the real place and
purpose of the meeting.128 Thoroughly in keeping with his character, "he
thought this could be done in a quiet undemonstrative way."l29 And so it
was. Vere's secret summons worked as planned; word did not get out
among the crew at large.
Even when the confrontation between Billy and Claggart initially
went awry, Vere more than kept his wits about him. Billy mistakenly but
plausibly believed the meeting was about his being promoted to
captain's coxswain; he assumed Claggart was there to give a positive
assessment of his performance. When Claggart's accusation strikes Billy
literally dumb, Vere immediately recognizes the problem, instantly
seeing it as analogous to a speech impediment of a schoolmate of his.13 0
Placing a fatherly hand on Billy's shoulder, he tells him to take his time.
This genuinely generous gesture goes horribly awry, increasing rather
than diminishing Billy's frustration, which erupts in his fatally striking
Claggart.131 But no amount of foresight on Vere's part could have
predicted this turn of events. Only afterward, albeit very shortly
afterward, does Vere do anything even arguably amiss.
c. Vere's Handling of Billy Budd's Homicide
Immediately after Billy Budd, in uncontainable frustration, strikes
Claggart down, Vere loses neither his calm nor his fatherly mode. He
declares "fated boy . .. what have you done,"l32 but only in a whisper,
127. Id.
128. Id. at 45.
129. Id. at 44.




and he asks for Billy's help in the futile task of propping up the now
lifeless Claggart. Only then does Vere pause reflectively, cover his face,
and eventually re-emerge with his fatherliness replaced by the demeanor
of the military disciplinarian.
Here, we shall see, is where he fundamentally erred, setting in
motion a deadly chain of events. Here he might have taken a different
course, concealing, rather than revealing, Billy Budd's homicide. We,
Melville's readers, see both this option and its alternative, Vere's
decision to proceed formally and "legally." But his fellow officers see
only the course actually taken, the decision to call the military tribunal.
We see that the same process skews both. We are in a position to see
that, just as Vere called for the tribunal in an unduly agitated state of
mind, so, in the same state of mind, had he previously decided to go
forward "legally" at all. And, just as referring such matters to the
admiralty was the norm, so also was handling things secretly, discreetly,
the norm. But referring matters to the admiralty would have changed
nothing for Billy, and would have run very serious risks for the navy;
concealing the homicide, on the other hand, would have both saved Billy
and put the navy and the nation at less, not more, peril.
Before turning to that possibility, that excluded alternative, we must
examine the way Vere actually did handle Billy Budd's case, and the
evidence on the basis of which his fellow officers questioned his
judgment, even his sanity. As we shall see, they were ironically right in
their assessment of his mental deviation, even as they were wrong about
what he should have done differently.
In the immediate aftermath of the homicide, as we have seen, the
narrator tells us that a stern military discipline displaces Vere's
previously fatherly feeling for Billy. He orders an acquiescent Billy to an
aft statesroom, then sends for the surgeon to determine Claggart's
condition.133 Calling in the surgeon serves two purposes, one internal to
the plot, the other external. "Inside" the narrative, it gives Vere
confirmation of Claggart's death; more importantly, it gives us readers,
in the surgeon, an "internal" witness to Vere's conduct at the time,
particularly his next decision, calling the tribunal.
Vere's handling of the homicide involved three phases visible to his
fellow officers: his initial reaction to the surgeon's declaration of
Claggart's death, his immediately subsequent calling of the drumhead
court, and his conduct before that court. His fellow officers saw
evidence of mental deviation in all three phases. In the remainder of this
section, we need to see that, although his demeanor may well have been
133. Id. at 47.
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disquieting and his state of mind disturbed, his actual conduct of the case
was quite defensible, even inevitable, under the circumstances. What we
shall see in the next section is that one of those circumstances, the
disclosure of the homicide, was entirely within Vere's control;
concealment was an option at the outset, an option Vere fatally failed to
exercise, apparently even to consider.
d. The Decision to Call a Drumhead Court
After the doctor's confirmation of Claggart's death, Vere
convulsively seizes the surgeon's arm and exclaims, "[i]t is the divine
judgment on Ananias!"134 Only after becoming "absorbed in thought"
does he again convulse and declare: "Struck dead by an angel of God!
Yet the angel must hang!"135 After that outburst, Vere regains his
composure, recounts the killing to the surgeon, enlists his aid in
removing the corpse to a stateroom, and orders him to summon the
lieutenants and the captain of the marines for a drumhead court,
enjoining them to secrecy.13 6
The surgeon is deeply troubled by Vere's conduct, both his charged
reaction to the confirmation of Claggart's death and his decision to call
the tribunal. As to the latter, the surgeon thought Vere should have
followed the general practice of referral to the fleet command, as
opposed to holding his own drumhead court.13 7 The other officers, in
their turn, agreed with the surgeon.138 Having been informed of Vere's
calling of the tribunal, but not his state of mind, "[1]ike him [the
surgeon] too they seemed to think that such a matter should be referred
to the Admiral."l39 Thus everyone who knew of this decision-surgeon
and officers of the tribunal-thought referral to the admiralty was
preferable. But the narrator gives us ample reason to believe that Vere's
was the wiser course (once he chose to reveal the truth about
the homicide).
Indeed, according to the narrator, Vere himself would have
preferred the course his subordinates thought proper: "The case indeed
was such that fain would the Bellipotent's captain have deferred taking
any action whatever respecting it further than to keep the foretopman a
close prisoner till the ship re-joined the squadron and then submitting the
134. Id.
135. Id.





matter to the judgement of his Admiral." 40 Thus, at this critical initial
point of decision,14 1 Vere moved in a direction that, although clearly
legal, was not legally compelled;142indeed, it was, of the two courses
then open, the course least expected by his fellow officers because less
according to general practice. And Vere himself inclined toward the
more popular course. Though he was a strict disciplinarian, the narrator
tells us, "he was no lover of authority for mere authority's sake"; indeed,
"very far was he from embracing opportunities for monopolizing to
himself perils of moral responsibility, none at least that could properly
be referred to an official superior or shared with him by his official
equals or even subordinates."43 Thus the ideal compromise seemed to
be to call a tribunal of this own officers, a combination of necessarily
expedient action and shared responsibility. 144
The narrator makes clear that Vere chose as he did from two
concurrent impulses, an ingrained sense of duty and an instinctive sense
of danger. As to the sense of duty, the narrator tells us that the "true
military officer," like the "true monk" in his "self-abnegation," will keep
"his vows of allegiance to martial duty," even as the other "his vows of
monastic obedience."l4 5 As to Vere's sense of danger, the narrator is
equally clear:
Feeling that unless quick action was taken on it, the deed of the
foretopman, as soon as it should be known on the gun-decks would
tend to awaken any slumbering embers of the Nore [mutiny] among
the crew, a sense of the urgency of the case overruled in Captain Vere
every other consideration.146
The narrator leaves neither doubt that Vere dutifully called the drumhead
court to forestall mutiny, nor does the narrator give us any sense that
Vere's sense of duty was misplaced, or his sense of danger mistaken.'47
140. Id. at 50.
141. See Burt Neuborne, Spheres of Justice: Who Decides?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1090,
1091 (analyzing "the central legal issue raised in Billy Budd" as "whether Billy should have been
tried by a drumhead court or remitted to the fleet for a formal court-martial") (citation omitted).
142. See id. ("[T]he allocation [of decision-making authority] issue is more complex than a
bipolar choice between two spheres.").
143. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 50.
144. See Lawry, supra note 22, at 174 ("Vere exercise[d] his discretionary power to call a
drumhead court ... [b]ecause he feared mutiny if he did not dispose of this case with firmness and
speed"); see also id. at 177 ("Another reason that Vere called a drumhead court was to seek the help
and counsel of others.").
145. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 50.
146. Id.
147. Cf. Lawrence Friedman, Law, Force, and Resistance to Disorder in Herman Melville's
Billy Budd, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 61, 62-63 (2010) (locating Vere's fatal character flaw in his
obsessive anxiety about disorder).
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e. Vere's Conduct Before the Drumhead Court.
As with Vere's decision to call a drumhead court, so with his
insistence on its convicting Billy Budd, the surgeon and the other
officers thought Captain Vere mistaken, even deranged, at least initially,
and they clearly questioned the justice, if not the legality, of the result he
pressed them to.14 8 Scholars have long and deeply divided, of course, on
all these points. From a legal standpoint, several things about that result
itself are clear enough. First, the result Vere pressed for was entirely
legal, tragic though its consequences may have been. Second, Vere
pressed for that result with a basically sound understanding of the law's
capacity for policy-oriented, as opposed to strictly literal,
interpretation.1 4 9 Third, and most relevant to us here, the result Vere
pressed for was the one the law itself seemed to require in this situation.
The policy of the Mutiny Act was to err, painful though it might be, in
favor of the collective over the individual, if there were no alternative
course."so Real risks were not to be run in striking that balance; too much
was deemed at stake, precisely as Vere set out in his argument to the
court. Vere may not have believed entirely what he said about "role
morality" in his argument to the tribunal; he seems, rather, to have been
using the rhetorical means at hand to get the job done. In fact, the
narrator intimates that Vere may well have used procedural flexibility to
include on the court the master of marines, a slight but not
unprecedented irregularity, precisely because this kind of specious
argument would appeal to him.
Most significantly, deferring the case would have produced the
worst, not the best, of all worlds: It would have risked mutiny without
much prospect of saving Billy Budd;15 1 it would, in essence, have at best
passed the buck, and at worst let mutiny smolder, if not erupt. The basic
148. See MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 53 (The other officers were particularly
troubled by Vere's first comment about the "no fault" nature of the offense, which was "[c]ouched
in it seemed to them a meaning unanticipated, involving a prejudgment on the speaker's part.").
149. See Posner, Comment, supra note 62, at 72-73; see also POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE,
supra note 19, at 170-72 (analyzing Vere's argument and the balancing he conducts of the "two
tables" of the law).
150. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 55-56.
151. Lawry argues otherwise, supra note 22, at 181 ("Thus, Vere could have easily satisfied
the demands of strict justice, and at the same time served a higher justice or fairness that takes
circumstances into account, if he had held Billy for the Admiral."); see also id. at 183 ("[Vlere
could, in the circumstances set up by Melville, still have avoided injustice had he followed ordinary
practice and held Billy for the Admiral."). But, as Posner points out, the result under the law as
Melville gives it, would have been the same. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 19, at
166-67, 170-71. It is, for reasons already given, see supra Part II.B.b(1), irrelevant to our analysis of
the novel that many such cases were commuted or otherwise rendered without capital sentence.
Thus we are pressed back to other alternatives, like my own. See infra Part IH.A.3.
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point is this: Vere chose among alternative legal courses on the basis of
safety, the very purpose that the law's strictness was supposed to serve.
He rejected the other approaches, equally plausible as a matter of legal
interpretation,15 2 because he knew that the primary purpose of the
relevant law, preventing mutiny, could only be surely served this way.
He is quite explicit that the need to convict Billy Budd flows not only
from the compulsion of the Mutiny Act's letter, but also from the
rational appeal of its purpose. Asked whether the tribunal could not
convict, but then mitigate the penalty, he replies, "[m]y man, were that
clearly lawful for us under the circumstances consider the consequences
of such clemency."15 3 He then argues, to the tribunal's conviction, that
the crew would regard clemency as cowardice, with predictably
disastrous effects for both morale and discipline.154 Thus Vere's
argument is not for a slavish following of the letter of the law, but rather
an understanding service to the law's purpose, preservation of the rule of
law itself.
But, of course, Vere's fellow officers are acutely aware, as are we,
of two very significant, intimately related, points. First, Vere's choice
was made in a manifestly disturbed state of mind. Second, even if it
served one legal interest, preserving public order, it radically
compromised another, protecting an innocent's life. Melville scholars
have uniformly shared the subordinate officers' sense of tragedy, even as
they differ on their assessment of Vere's conduct and the law's
requirements. Those who come out in favor of Vere's decision to try
Billy and the appropriateness of his conviction tend to ignore his
agitated state of mind altogether or to dismiss it as a sort of "no harm, no
foul" offense. What does the skewed state of mind matter, if it produced
the appropriate result? On the other hand, those who find the result
unacceptable either fault Vere for taking an overly harsh view of the
law, or fault the over-harshness of the law for pressing its conscientious
agent to the brink of insanity, if not beyond. Melville scholars, like
Vere's officers, take the disclosure of Billy Budd's conduct as a
necessary given, disputing only what was to be done about it, and why.
There is, however, a very different way of dealing with these two
related points, the law's manifestly harsh penalty on the "naturally
innocent" Billy and Vere's obviously grave state of mental agitation in
pressing for that result. What if Vere's agitation, a kind of "harmless
152. See Lawry, supra note 22, at 181-83 (discussing the legality of simply handing Billy over
to the Admiral).
153. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 56.
154. Cf. Lawry, supra note 22, at 185 ("He might have followed the option suggested by one of
the adjudicators: conviction and mitigation.").
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error" once he chose to make the truth of Claggart's death public, in fact
caused Vere to make an absolutely catastrophic error at an immediately
prior juncture, the point at which he decided to reveal, rather than
conceal, the truth about what actually caused Claggart's death? Vere
may have been right, once the truth was out, to call the tribunal and
insist on conviction. But he was evidently suffering under some distress,
some disturbance of mind. Are we merely to conclude "no harm, no
foul"? Or is that very oddity to press us back to see that the harm was
readily avertable, and thus the foul very great?
What we need to explore in the next section, then, is the possibility
that Vere's agitated state of mind caused him to overlook or reject an
alternative that might well have reconciled both of the law's substantive
goals, individual rights and public security, by a much less severe
sacrifice of one of its procedural goals, administrative transparency. Like
his decision to call the drumhead court, Vere's arguments for conviction
turn on a single critical assumption: Claggart's death at Billy Budd's
hands will be known, sooner or later, to everyone on board ship. Yet this
critical variable is very much in Captain Vere's hands. Leave that
assumption in place, and his arguments to the court are completely
compelling and the court's sentence inevitable as a matter of proper
legal reasoning. Billy Budd's death is tragic: Law compels the death of
the innocent one to save the many. But remove the assumption that the
real cause of Claggart's death must be publicly known, and Billy Budd's
death is not necessary, but gratuitous. It is not an example of the maxim
that hard cases make bad law, but rather evidence that law may offer a
way, within itself, rightly understood, to reconcile public needs and
private rights.
3. The Course Vere Did Not Take: Concealing the Homicide
Let us consider, then, the course that Vere did not take, the course
from which he initially "veered." Most starkly stated, that course was
simply to report Claggart's death as an accident, enjoining Billy Budd
not to reveal the truth. Keeping the homicide a secret would have neatly
averted Billy Budd's trial and conviction; if it were not known that he
struck Claggart, there would be no need to proceed against him under
the Mutiny Act. This would obviate the need not only for a drumhead
court, where the law seemed to require his conviction, but also any
referral to the admiralty, where his conviction would have been equally
inevitable, if a bit later. Innocence would thus have been spared, in
accord with one of the law's most basic goals.
At the same time, the Mutiny Act's more particular goal,
preservation of public safety, would also have been served. Concealing
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the real cause of Claggart's death would have removed any risk that
leniency toward Billy, sooner or later, might undermine discipline and
hence run the risk of another mutiny. If no one knew Billy had struck
Claggart, no one could have seen laxity in not punishing him for it. As a
practical matter, the lie would have been plausible enough; shipboard
accidents were (and are) commonplace, and the blow to Claggart's head
could as easily have come from a slip and fall down a treacherously wet
stairway as from Billy's fist. Either way, Claggart is at the bottom of the
steps, dead from a fatal head injury.
Not insignificantly, the world-legally and morally, literally and
symbolically-is a better place for it. Virtually no one doubts Vere's
initial judgment about Billy's fatal blow: "It is the divine judgment on
Ananias!"155 Indeed, the narrator gives us to understand that Claggart is
to be identified, not only with the thieving Ananias,156 but also with the
very devil himself, his deed with the original and elemental wrong,
tempting innocence to its own destruction. What's more, even as Vere
himself instantly realizes, Billy's hand is, in a fundamental sense, the
hand of cosmic justice itself. Claggart, he declares, is "struck dead by an
angel of God!"151 What radically does not follow, what troubles us
deeply, is Vere's immediately subsequent non sequitur: And yet the
angel must die!
But the alternative of concealment, elegant though it is, is not
without problems of its own. Can it have occurred to Vere, given what
we know of his character? On first face, it is easy to dismiss
concealment as an alternative that Vere would never consider. Can it be
an alternative that Melville is offering, within the narrative, to us? We
need to look, then, at how consistent it is with both his character and the
course of the plot; as we shall see, these factors are inextricably
interwoven in Melville's narrative. To say that it could have happened,
of course, is not to say that it should have. Is it an alternative we can
accept? We will need to look, next, at the popular acceptance of just
such concealments, both in general and in a familiar and paradigmatic
case of law-abiding violations of law. Then we can ask whether, for all
their popular appeal, this is an alternative that we can consider both just
and lawful. We need to see that such intuitively appealing concealments
can be understood, not only as consistent with legality, but also as
155. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 47. Richard Weisberg sees Claggart as Christ,
but this is a view very compelling questioned by others. See POSNER, LAW AND LITrERATURE, supra
note 19, at 167 ("even a rabid anti-Christian--even a Nietzsche-could not find any similarity in
character or deeds between Christ and Claggart.").
156. Acts 5:1-6 (Revised Standard).
157. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 47.
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required by law's deepest strivings for justice. For that, we must
examine the normative case for an apparent paradox, breaking the law in
order to serve, even save, the law.
Finally, against that background, we can approach the question
toward which my title directs us: Why, in light of all this, did Vere not
choose the course of concealment? We need to see exactly why Vere
could not consider it, and why considering it would be perfectly
compatible with the relationship between the law and its agents that has
been both academically defended and popularly accepted. As we shall
see, Vere could not consider this alternative because he was committed
to taking the most personally painful of alternative public actions; this
tropism, in turn, blinded him to a profound jurisprudential reality:
Sometimes the law's agents, in order to serve the law's spirit, must
violate its letter. Vere could not see what we must see, which is what we
have always known: At least sometimes, the letter killeth, when the
spirit could give life.'
a. The "Intrinsic" Plausibility of Concealment: Consistency
with Plot and Character
Vere's decisions that most troubled his peers, going forward with a
drumhead court and then pressing for conviction and execution, parallel
a prior decision, visible to only two people within the narrative, Vere
and Billy Budd. The officers can, in the very nature of the narrative's
unfolding, look only at Vere's conduct after his revelation of the
homicide; by contrast, the narrator explicitly has us look backward as
well as forward, to his narrative as a whole. And parallels within that
narrative also point us to a synoptic perspective. The final private
interview of Vere and Billy-again, outside the purview of Vere's
officers-effectively leads us to consider their first private interview,
immediately after the homicide.
Vere's decision there, visible only to Billy Budd, nicely parallels, in
both its form and its content, the decision, seen by the surgeon, that first
called into question the captain's sanity. In the scene with the surgeon,
"Captain Vere, with one hand to his brow, was standing motionless"; a
little later, "Captain Vere was now again motionless, standing absorbed
in thought."159 In the earlier scene, alone with Billy Budd, "Captain Vere
with one hand covering his face stood to all appearance as impassive as
the object at his feet,"' Claggart's corpse. Just there, the narrator raises
158. 2 Corinthians 3:6 (Revised Standard).




a vital question: "Was he absorbed in taking in all the bearings of the
event and what was best not only now at once to be done, but also in the
sequel?"16 1 If so, then he may have made errors in judgment here parallel
to those that others who saw him thought he made later; just as we are
explicitly invited to examine those later errors, so we are implicitly
invited to look for an error here. Indeed, the very "harmlessness" of any
later errors, given what we have seen to be the Mutiny Act's inexorable
result, presses us either to think that that the result is appropriate, or,
alternatively, to look back for an earlier, "harmful" error.
In making the initial, critical decision, alone with Billy Budd, Vere
visibly changed from paternalism to something very different: "The
father in him, manifested towards Billy thus far in the scene, was
replaced by the military disciplinarian."1 6 2 What follows from that turn,
we know all too well from its sequel: the calling of the drumhead court,
Billy's conviction and execution. But we are led to wonder: What might
have followed from the continuation of his fatherly mode?
We get an important glimpse of this possibility in Captain Vere's
final interview with Billy Budd, after the trial. In that scene, we see the
reversal of Vere's initial change from father to military disciplinarian,
and we see it in just the tentative, hypothetical terms in which we must
speculate about the possibility of a parallel concealment at the
beginning. Speculating on the final interview, the narrator tells us
that Vere:
[W]as old enough to have been Billy's father. The austere devotee of
military duty letting himself melt back into what remains primeval in
our formalised humanity may in end have caught Billy to his heart
even as Abraham may have caught young Isaac on the brink of
resolutely offering him up in obedience to the exacting behest.163
As we shall see in the next Part, this allusion to Abraham's near
sacrifice of Isaac calls into question the very core of the Judeo-Christian
creed, the God who demands, and makes, extreme sacrifices. Here we
need to note how the qualities revealed in that final meeting might,
properly deployed in the earlier meeting, over Claggart's corpse, have
completely averted the disaster of Billy's death and fully vindicated not
only "natural justice" for innocents, but also the law's deep interest in
their protection, without increasing at all, and perhaps diminishing
more,16 the risk of mutiny.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 58.
164. See id. at 64 (describing a mutinous undercurrent at the moment of Billy's hanging); see
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At the outset of that final interview, the narrator describes the
characters of Billy Budd and Captain Vere as "each radically sharing in
the rarer qualities of our nature."165 This may well have made it possible
for them to be completely candid with one another, completely
transparent o each other. Thus the narrator speculates that, in delivering
the verdict, Vere would have "concealed nothing from the condemned
one" and "frankly disclosed to him the part he himself had played in
bringing about the decision, at the same time revealing his actuating
motives." 66 This confession may well have been one that Billy could
fully "appreciate," in both senses of that word. He would have
understood the trust that it implied of the captain for him, and he would
have been grateful for the manifestation of that trust: "Not without a sort
of joy indeed he might have appreciated the brave opinion of him
implied in his Captain['s] making such a confidant of him." 6 7
Against that background, the narrator suggests the analogy between
Vere as Abraham and Billy as Isaac, "on the brink of resolutely offering
him up in obedience to the exacting behest."168 Pressed any further,
though, the analogy rings radically false: Isaac, unlike Billy, was spared.
God, whatever the merits of this inhumane test of Abraham's faith,
relents at the last;169 in sharpest contrast, Vere's apparent masters-the
law in general, his own devotion to military duty in particular-never
relents. God provides an alternative sacrificial victim, the ram caught in
the thicket by his horns. We are left to wonder whether there might be
such an alternative in Billy's case, and who it is that might provide it.
The answer to this latter question may be Vere himself; in a proper
relationship to both Billy and the law, he may well have been able to
obviate the need for any sacrifice at all or, at worst, sacrificed a lesser
value to a greater.
Billy, as the closeted scene with Vere is designed to show, is
entirely trustworthy, capable of understanding and keeping the most
significant of confidences. Indeed, by this time we have already seen
Billy Budd conceal, in misguided innocence, a much weightier secret,
also Reich, supra note 19, at 139 ("Nor is the punishment useful in curbing mutinous tendencies
among the crew; as we are shown, Billy's execution is far more likely to cause mutiny that to quell
it.").




169. See Lawry, supra note 22, at 184 (noting that "[n]o human idea of justice could conceive
that it" was "just to order Abraham to slay his son Isaac," but concluding that "[p]erhaps God's
ways are not our ways, as the Scriptures tirelessly tell us.") (citations omitted).
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his assignation by one who seems to have been a genuine mutineer.17 0
He failed to report this on his own initiative, and he failed to reveal it on
direct examination in his trial. Vere, then, would not have been teaching
a purely honest innocent to lie; he would have been showing a
misguided protector of the seditious how to lie to protect, not the guilty,
but the innocent, even when the innocent is himself. If Billy is capable
of keeping confidences after the end of the proceeding, as the narrator
suggests, why could he not have kept hem before the beginning?
What must be sacrificed, significantly, is not Billy Budd the
innocent, but the innocence of Billy Budd. And that latter, as we have
seen, is not so pure as it at first appeared. Though Billy Budd lacks the
sophistication to make an intentionally double-tongued sally on leaving
the Rights of Man, he is not above lying to protect a possible plotter.
Vere would have been taking him into a plot, but with a very different
goal, good rather than evil. Billy's compromised innocence then, would
not have been so much lost, as redeemed, where redemption means
civilized, brought into the service of the commonwealth,17 1 made an
integral part of the ship-board republic.
Vere himself has already proved to be the master of secrecy, at
every prior stage of the process. Vere, we are told repeatedly, kept
various aspects of the proceeding secret: the original calling of Billy to
answer Claggart's accusation, the concealing of Claggart's corpse in one
of the staterooms, the summons of the surgeon, and the constituting of
the drumhead court itself. At several points, he actively engaged his
agents in assisting his concealments; he often relied in these matters on
his "hammock-boy, a sort of sea-valet in whose discretion and fidelity
his master had much confidence."1 72 These concealments in the
particulars of Billy Budd's case, moreover, were not out of keeping with
Vere's general character; quite the contrary. Melville repeatedly and
positively refers to Vere's "quiet undemonstrative way" and the rare
circumstances in which he departs from it. If anything, it is his
"demonstrativeness" in response to Billy Budd's case that is precisely
what initially strikes the surgeon as unusual.
To be sure, Vere's secrecy in various aspects of Billy Budd's case
was questioned by his critics.17 3 Melville's repeated references to
170. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 34.
171. Even so, in Plato's Republic, the innocents Glaucon and Adeimantus initially shocked to
learn that literally untrue accounts about the random assorting of talents among all citizens must be
cultivated in order to establish the regime's meritocracy, eventually embrace the practice. PLATO,
supra note 54, bk. III, at 93-99.
172. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 45.
173. Id. at 49-50.
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secrecy cast doubt on this alternative, itself never explicitly raised, by
casting doubts on other "secret" actions. At the very beginning, the
surgeon had misgivings about concealing Claggart's body.17 4 More
generally, the narrator tells us, Vere was "not a little criticized by some
officers" for keeping the entire proceeding a secret as long as possible.17 5
The narrator himself expresses doubts on the general question of
secrecy: "Here he may or may not have erred."'7 6 "[I]n these particulars
lurked some resemblance to the policy adopted in those tragedies of the
palace which have occurred more than once in the capital founded by
Peter the Barbarian."17 7
But, the narrator also tells us, Vere had his defenders, including the
very cousin who had given him his sobriquet "Starry" as a proud
reference to their rigorous, reforming ancestor. More generally, Vere's
detractors are lesser men unable to take the full measure of his merit.178
Even as we have seen them as generally wrong about the more aloof side
of his character, so here we see them wrong about this particular aspect
of his conduct. If he had not kept the matter a tight secret, he would have
risked a mutiny; his procedural handling of the case nicely matched the
substantive purpose of the law. It would have been absurd to place form
over substance, to risk a mutiny by publicizing a trial the very purpose of
which was to forestall a mutiny. On this the narrator would clearly have
us think Vere was correct. And this permits us to see a neat paradox that
must be lost on them, and for that very reason may be right: What the
situation called for was not less secrecy, but more.
In just the same way, the narrator's allusion to Russian palace
intrigues is not itself wholly negative, at least to the knowing. "Peter the
Barbarian,179 is also Peter the Great; "Barbarian" reflects the scorn of
backward-looking orthodox Russophiles, opponents of Peter's
"Enlightenment," if not always enlightened, reforms; "the Great" is the
verdict of Europe and the West, toward which Peter wanted to move his
homeland. And secrecy was famously a part of that program. So, in
Moby Dick, Melville can favorably compare the harpooner Queequeg's
enlisting in a Western whaling ship to Peter's spying out Western naval
ways: "But like Czar Peter content to toil in the shipyards of foreign
cities, Queequeg disdained no seeming ignominy, if thereby he might
174. Id. at 48.
175. Id. at 49.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 50.
178. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 158 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988) ("The
surgeon's speculation that Vere might be crazy should not be taken at face value; it is a commentary
on the surgeon's inability to understand a greatly superior person.").
179. MELVILLE,BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 50.
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happily gain the power of enlightening his untutored countrymen."so
Like Peter, "[t]here was excellent blood in his veins-royal stuff." 8' And
more excellent, ironically, even than that, from an American and
republican perspective: "Queequeg was George Washington
cannibalistically developed."1 82
Thus, although each exercise of secrecy was questioned, each was
also defensible. Each seems, under the circumstances, to have been the
right and prudent thing. Taken together, they also reveal something
essential about the nature of secrecy and its apparent opposite,
disclosure. They are not polar opposites, with disclosure a virtue and
secrecy a vice. They are, rather, extremes on either end of a prudential
spectrum. Virtue lies in the middle, at the Aristotelian mean. Just as
disclosure is not an absolute virtue, so secrecy is not an absolute vice.
The proper measure of each, rather, is relative to the circumstances at
hand. It is, in that respect, very like the choice between severity and
laxity, caution and risk, which, as we saw in the other context, also
involves finding the right mean. Excessive secrecy is bad, inconsistent
with good government; excessive disclosure is bad, risking loss of
control over the unsophisticated governed.8 3
The converse of keeping secrets from unreliable subordinates, of
course, is revealing them to responsible superiors. Even if Vere had kept
the truth about the homicide secret from both the crew and his inferior
officers, he may well have been bound to reveal it to his own superior
officer, the admiral of the fleet. This would have both preserved the law
and protected Billy Budd, at the expense of Vere; had the Admiral
disagreed with Vere's course of conduct, Vere himself would have
suffered. And this would have made Vere, not Billy Budd, the victim,
the sacrificial lamb. It would have been the father's sacrifice, not the
son's, that saved the world. This, too, seems thoroughly in keeping with
Vere's character as a conscientious naval officer, superior in rank to
some, in his turn subordinate to others.
On the other hand, there is clear evidence, in the narrative itself, of
the fatal danger of "over-exposure." That, of course, is precisely what
happened in Billy Budd's case. But here Billy Budd is in the very best of
tragically good company; "over-exposure" was fatal to both Verel84 and
180. 1 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR, THE WHALE 61 (Heritage ed. 1943) (1851).
181. Id. at 60.
182. Id. at 55.
183. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. V, at 235 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1931)
(c. 350 B.C.E.) (establishing and preserving governments as a matter of finding the appropriate
mean).
184. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 69 ("Captain Vere in the act of putting his ship
alongside the enemy with a view of throwing his boarders across her bulwarks, was hit by a musket-
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Nelson, as victims of literal "snipers." If Vere had taken the course I
recommend, his figurative "snipers" would not have even known about
it. A secret shot, fired from within the enemy's main cabin, laid low the
figure of fatherly benevolent rule on the Bellipotent; had Vere been
concealed, he might have lived. Even so the angelic Billy Budd's blow
to the serpentine Claggart, delivered in the main cabin of the Bellipotent
itself, rid her of the very figure of evil incarnate; had Billy been
concealed, he might have survived. And Vere's death, of course, was a
prefigure of Nelson's death on the deck of the Victory at Trafalgar. The
narrator makes quite clear that some thought Nelson's exposure was
vainglorious, and that it cost not only his life, but also an even greater
allied victory.8
As we have seen, the Mutiny Act, once publicly invoked, can,
consistent with the clear directive of the law and the demands of the
situation, produce only one result.186 At the outset of the case, though,
there is a radically different alternative, at the very limit of law: The
Mutiny Act in its letter, in order to serve its deeper spirit and that of law
more generally, need not be invoked at all. Concealing the truth about
Claggart's death is a very real possibility within the structure of the
story. It not only fits the plot, but elements of the plot neatly point us to
the possibility. It is also consistent with Vere's balanced use of secrecy
in other contexts, and his extraordinary discretion in all matters of
importance.
b. The "Extrinsic" Plausibility of Concealment: Consistency
with Readerly Expectations
But to say that Vere's concealment is consistent within the story
raises, almost automatically, a question at another level of analysis:
Would presenting that possibility "sell" to likely readers of the story? Or
would the alternative of concealment sound to them like too much to ask
of law enforcement officers, too much latitude to give lawyers and other
agents of the law? It is impossible to answer these questions with
absolute precision. And yet, near the core of many of our paradigm
"lawyer stories," something very like this frequently happens.
Significantly, this possibility is typically much more appealing to the
laity and the lawyerly rank-and-file than to the profession's theoretical
elite. This Part analyzes whether the concealment has what we might call
"extrinsic" plausibility. It is, we shall see in the final Part, absolutely
ball from a porthole of the enemy's main cabin.").
185. Id. at 14.
186. See supra Part IIB.
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essential to a "republican" reading of Billy Budd. If Billy Budd is to
succeed, as the Republic succeeds, it must present an alternative that is
plausible, not only to the fictional characters within the story, but also to
the real readers outside the story. It must, like the Republic, create a
fictional world that we the readers would be willing to "enact" in our
real world, as its model and prototype.
Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird is, by all accounts, among the
most popular and appealing of our culture's lawyers stories, much-
beloved by lawyers and lay-folk alike.187 The conclusion of that novel
presents us with a virtuous but illegal "cover-up" instructively analogous
to the situation in Billy Budd. Atticus Finch, the bar establishment's
poster-boy of the ideal lawyer, has profoundly offended the town
reprobate, Robert E. Lee Ewell, by discrediting on cross examination
Ewell's false allegation that a Black man, Tom Robinson, attempted to
rape his daughter. The racist, all-white jury convicts Robinson
nonetheless, but Ewell's anger is unassuaged. He vows to avenge
himself, and he chooses as his targets Atticus's children, Jem and Scout.
As they walk home alone one fall evening from a school pageant, Ewell
waylays them in the shadows, attempting to stab them to death with a
switch-blade. And he would certainly have succeeded, but for the
intervention of the children's self-appointed guardian angel, their
reclusive neighbor, Arthur Boo Radley. Radley pulls Ewell away from
Scout, stabs him to death with a kitchen knife, and then carries the badly
injured Jem home, with Scout in tow.
Atticus has the local doctor and sheriff summoned; after the doctor
stabilizes Jem's condition, the sheriff and Atticus discuss how to handle
the situation. Atticus insists on doing what he thinks is right, but he is
thoroughly addled about what actually happened. He assumes that his
son Jem killed Ewell with Ewell's own knife, and he insists on having
this account presented at the coroner's inquest. There, Atticus assures
the sheriff, he himself will justify the homicide as self-defense.
The sheriff, for his part, takes a very different tack; he insists: "Bob
Ewell fell on his knife."188 Atticus mistakes this as a friendly but morally
187. Rob Atkinson, Liberating Lawyers: Divergent Parallels in Intruder in the Dust and To
Kill a Mockingbird, 49 DUKE L. J. 601, 735-36 (1999); see Top Rated Movies, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/chart/top (last visited Sept. 17, 2019) (IMDb.com's list of top 250 movies of
all time, which places To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD at number 99); see also Top Heroes and Villains
Named in Movie List, NEWS.COM.AU: ENTERTAINMENT (Nov. 26, 2007, 1:46 PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080207153521/http://www.news.com.au/entertainment/story/0,2627
8,22822370-10388,00.html (list of the top 100 movie heroes of all time, which places Atticus Finch
at number 50).
188. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 315 (35th anniversary ed., HarperCollins
Publishers 1995) (1960).
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misguided effort to cover up his son's homicide, and he insists that the
truth be told. Otherwise, he fears, his son will grow up under a cloud of
suspected favoritism before the law; worse still, both his son and his
daughter will lose their respect for him, their only living parent, as a
proper citizen and agent of the law.
But the sheriff eventually persuades Atticus of what actually
happened, and why the identity of Boo Radley, Ewell's real killer and
the rescuer of Atticus's children, must be covered up:
I never heard tell that it's against the law for a citizen to do his utmost
to prevent a crime from being committed, which is exactly what he
[Boo Radley] did, but maybe you'll say it's my duty to tell the town all
about it and not hush it up. Know what'd happen then? All the ladies in
Maycomb includin' my wife'd be knocking on his door bringing angel
food cakes. To my way of thinkin', Mr. Finch, taking the one man
who's done you and this town a great service an' dragging him with
his shy ways into the limelight-to me, that's a sin. It's a sin and I'm
not about to have it on my head. If it was any other man it'd be
different. But not this man, Mr. Finch.'"
Repeating his insistence that "Bob Ewell fell on his knife," the sheriff
stamps off into the night.' 90
This leaves Atticus on the front porch with his daughter, at a loss to
explain his connivance in what she knows to be a false account. He
repeats that account, and asks her, "Can you possibly understand?" To
his surprise and relief, she understands completely; she has learned the
lesson of the novel, the lesson we, too, are apparently to learn: "Yes sir, I
understand .. . Mr. Tate [the sheriff] was right. . . . it'd be sort of like
shootin' a mockingbird, wouldn't it?"l 91
Atticus, early in the book, had forbidden Jem and Scout to shoot
mockingbirds with their Christmas BB guns: "[R]emember it's a sin to
kill a mockingbird."1 92 Unlike the rascally and raucous jays,
"Mockingbirds don't do one thing but make music for us to enjoy."193 In
the rather heavy-handed symbolism of the book, we have two
eponymous mockingbirds. The first, Atticus's ill-fated Black client, is
falsely accused of rape precisely because he has selflessly assisted a
poor young white woman; madly fleeing prison after his unjust
conviction, he is shot to death. The second mockingbird is Jem and
Scout's savior, Boo Radley. It is absolutely pivotal to the book's moral
189. Id. at 317-18.
190. Id. at 318.
191. Id.




message that he, at the more merciful hands of Atticus and Scout, be
spared. And it is equally vital to the book's legal message that his
salvation come through the false testimony, in a formal legal proceeding,
of the town's most respected lawyer and long-time law-honoring sheriff.
This is the Gospel of To Kill a Mockingbird: The letter killeth; the spirit
giveth life.
Like To Kill a Mockingbird's Sheriff Tate, Captain Vere is "the
law" in his domain; like Sheriff Tate, he has in his hands a "natural"
innocent whose commission of homicide has rid the world of a moral
monster. Vere is, in fact, a much more nearly absolute law, and much
more sophisticated legal agent. And his prot6g6 and surrogate son, Billy
Budd, is presented to us as quite capable of keeping confidences,194 even
very dangerous confidences, every bit as much as Atticus's much
younger daughter Scout. Vere certainly has it within his power to do
what Sheriff Tate did, what he eventually convinced the supremely
scrupulous Atticus to join him in doing: violating the letter of the law by
misrepresenting facts in a coroner's inquest, the better to save a life.
Indeed, where Sheriff Tate was only figuratively saving a life,
preserving the peculiarly private quality of Boo Radley's reclusive
existence, Vere would have been literally saving Billy from an horrific
and ignominious execution.
The way this "precedent" works, it is important to see, is only
partial and provisional. It works, that is, not as a full-blown normative
justification, but in two other ways: as examples of what plausible
characters can be expected to be capable of doing, and as evidence of
what general readers will be willing to accept as proper. We turn, now,
to the fuller normative justification of lying to serve the law.
c. The Justifiability of Concealment: The Convergence of Law
and Justice in Legal Law-Breaking
It has often been remarked that popular lawyer stories frequently
involve the triumph of justice over legality;195 indeed, in the words of
one commentator, "the lawyer must be lawless to uphold the law." 9 6
One of the things that make Billy Budd disturbing (and perhaps
unpopular) is that it has no such "Hollywood" ending. The conflict
between justice and law, resolved in favor of justice at the expense of
194. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 88 ("he [Budd] does not prove to be totally incapable of
lying").
195. See Robert Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75
CAL. L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1987); see also SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 95, at 93-95.
196. Post, supra note 195, at 382.
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law in popular fiction, is tragically resolved the other way in Billy Budd.
What we need to see here is that it could have been resolved, in Billy
Budd's case and elsewhere, in favor of both law and justice, by a more
sophisticated understanding of law itself. On this view, breaking the
literal law may be in the service, not only of justice, but also of the law
itself, better understood-and understood in a way made generally
accessible through just such stories.
Since Watergate, we are deeply inclined to believe that "It's not the
crime, it's the cover-up." (And, with our appropriately raised
sensitivities about domestic violence, we are profoundly disinclined to
credit accounts of serious injuries that involve falls down stairways.) But
it may be more respectful of the law itself to admit that, in a significant
class of cases, it is the other way around: Sometimes the nature of the
crime demands, in law and in justice, a cover-up. More generally,
sometimes law's agents must choose the spirit of the law over its letter.
William Simon has spelled this position out admirably in his
Practice of Justice.19 7 Simon's principal task is to offer an alternative to
what he calls the Dominant View of legal ethics. That view maintains
that anything a lawyer does for a client, within the strict letter of the law,
is professionally appropriate, even virtuous, no matter how thoroughly it
frustrates either the spirit of the law or extra-legal norms like ordinary
morality.19 8 In the bulk of his book, Simon demonstrates the weakness of
the Dominant View and offers an alternative, under which proper
lawyering advances, not all literally legal claims of clients, but only
those consistent with a nuanced, contextualized understanding of the
law's purpose. Lawyers, as lawyers, are to "practice justice" because
justice is not a value extraneous to law, but the very core value of
law itself.
Here we need to examine a corollary of the Dominant View, and
Simon's critique of that corollary. Just as the Dominant View holds that
all lawyerly action within the strict letter of the law is proper,
irrespective of how much that action frustrates the law's spirit, so the
Dominant View maintains the converse: any legal action in conflict with
the law's letter is improper, however much it advances the law's spirit,
which Simon identifies with justice. Just as the Dominant View
categorically excuses, or congratulates, all strictly legal conduct, so it
categorically condemns all breaches of the law's letter, no matter how
technical, and no matter how much they further the manifest purpose of
197. See generally SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 95.
198. See id. at 78-79.
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the law itself.1 99 Simon, by contrast, maintains just the opposite: Even as
lawyers must, in the service of justice, sometimes do less for their clients
than the letter of the law allows, so also they must sometimes do more;
sometimes they must transgress law's letter to serve its spirit, justice.200
Simon points out that the Dominant View's narrow legalism is not
just theoretically suspect; it is also practically dangerous, a threat to the
accomplishment of justice in particular cases. This danger lies in the way
the Dominant View frames cases like Billy Budd's. The Dominant View
automatically characterizes any conscientious inclination to violate the
letter of the law as a conflict between law and some extrinsic norm,
typically justice or individual morality. This framing of the question,
Simon argues, always tips the scales in favor of literal legal compliance,
even though it does not preclude striking the balance in favor of justice
or morality over law, narrowly defined. But it does preclude something
else: Recognition that a choice in favor of justice and against legality,
narrowly defined, may be a choice in favor of both justice and law,
broadly defined.2 0 1
The Dominant View's "law or justice" framing is exactly the rubric
under which both traditionalists and revisionists assess the law and
Captain Vere's response to it in Billy Budd's case. Either the law's
inexorable insistence on Billy Budd's death justly struck the balance
between the individual and society, as the traditional view maintains, or
it did not, as the revisionists maintain. If the law was unjust in its
harshness, then either Vere rightly honored his obligation to obey even
an unjust law, as the School of Resignation maintains, or he should have
conscientiously violated the law to achieve extra-legal justice, or
compliance with higher, supra-human law, as the School of
Resistance insists.
Posed this way, evaluating Vere and the law requires impaling
oneself on either horn of a painful dilemma: justice or law. Assessment
of my concealment alternative can also be framed that way: Should Vere
fulfill a legal obligation to disclose the truth of Billy's homicide, thus
setting in motion the inexorable injustice of his trial and execution, or
should he violate his legal obligation to save Billy from that injustice?
The choice between concealment and disclosure would thus pose the
familiar dilemma of the Dominant View: Concealment advances justice
at the expense of law; disclosure advances law at the expense of justice.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 81-82.
201. Id. at 102-03.
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But Simon's analysis offers a radically different way to see the
course of concealment. It is the way that Simon recommends in a large
class of structurally parallel cases: a transgression of the letter of the law
to serve the spirit of the law. On this view, the law itself compels, rather
than forbids, concealment; concealment vindicates, rather than violates,
legal norms.
A Simonian legal analysis of the course of concealment would go
like this. Three values of republican law are at stake here: public safety,
individual fairness, and administrative transparency. As Melville has
stacked the deck, only two of the three can be fully honored: If we are to
protect public safety in a transparent administrative proceeding, Billy
Budd must die. If, however, we are willing to sacrifice a measure of
administrative transparency, to conceal the truth about Claggart's death,
then we can preserve the other two values: Discipline in the navy can be
preserved, even as Billy Budd's life is spared.
What is more, this result is defensible not merely as morally just,
but also as legally appropriate, as the result that, in the circumstances of
this particular case, rightly balances the relevant legal values, here
innocent life and public safety over against administrative transparency.
To think of transparency as the supreme value in all legal affairs is not to
honor law over justice; it is simply to honor a vision of law that
inflexibly privileges one legal value over other, competing legal
values.2 0 2 Another, more comprehensive view of law sees the
subordination of one legal value to another as a relatively routine
function of both the law and its agents. On this latter, more expansive
view of the law, we cannot say that either approach, disclosure or
concealment, is categorically legal or illegal. On the other hand, we can
discuss, quite comfortably, which course is the legally better course, not
simply the more just or fair or moral. On my view of the merits of the
matter, the legally better course is concealment, because it achieves the
most situationally appropriate balancing of the three relevant values, all
of which are internal to the legal system itself.
This view of the merits can also be criticized from the expansive
legal perspective, but not nearly as well. This is largely because seeing
the course of disclosure in a more expansive way does not reveal a way
for the law and Vere to get out of their predicament. The striking fact
about Vere's conduct once he chooses to disclose Billy's homicide is
202. See John P. McWilliams, Jr., Innocent Criminal or Criminal Innocence: The Trial in
American Fiction, in CARL S. SMITH, JOHN P. MCWLLIAMS, AND MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, LAW
AND AMERICAN LITERATURE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 45, 74-76 (1983) [hereinafter
"McWilliams, Innocent Criminal"] (arguing that Vere's jurisprudence of societal need over
individual rights is that of Holmes's The Common Law).
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this: He does, in fact, follow a very sophisticated understanding of the
law. As we have seen, he is no legal literalist; he understands that the
spirit of the Mutiny Act, in the circumstances of the case, requires rigor;
he does not seek an extreme result because he is an inflexible agent of
the law, a Javert or a Martinet.
Non-legal readers of Billy Budd, of course, can hardly be faulted for
failing to anticipate Simon's subtle jurisprudential critique of the
Dominant View of legal ethics. And, as its very name implies, the
Dominant View is prevalent even among lawyers themselves. But once
we understand that the choice between concealment and disclosure can
be seen as a conflict, not between law and morality, but within law itself,
we are at the threshold of another possibility: That choice can also be
seen as a choice within morality itself, too.
In some ways, in fact, this is the more plausible framing, both
prima facie and on closer inspection. The narrative never explicitly
poses any legal problem with Vere's concealing the truth about the
homicide. Our deeper, Simonian analysis reveals that administrative
transparency is indeed a legal value brought into play explicitly
elsewhere in the narrative, and implicitly here, at the point where Vere
veered. But concealment, though obviously at odds with this particular
legal value, is much harder to see as the violation of any literal legal
obligation. We are given a very strong sense that Billy Budd was under
just such an obligation to report the mutinous plot in which Claggart's
agents seem to have been trying to enmesh him. But we are given no
such clear sense that, once an impropriety comes to the attention of the
highest legal official in the ship's microcosmic legal world, there is
anything he must necessarily do. To the contrary, in fact: Prosecutorial
discretion is very deeply imbedded in our concept of a prosecutor's legal
duty. Some cases, for a wide range of legitimate reasons, simply should
not be brought.20 3 If the Mutiny Act in any way cut back on this basic
assumption, the narrative in no way informs us of it, and the narrator is
quite clear that it is on the basis of the narrative that we are to make our
assessment of Captain Vere.
What troubles us with the concealment alternative, I suspect, is not
so much that it is legally appropriate, but that it is morally suspect. It
would not violate any law, but it would inevitably involve lying. The
concealment alternative thus poses a conflict between a narrower and a
broader view of morality, even as it poses a conflict between a narrower
and a broader view of legality. Just as a more nuanced legal analysis
203. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9 (AM. BAR
ASS'N 1992).
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requires balancing three legal values-public security, individual rights,
and administrative transparency-so a more nuanced moral analysis
requires three moral values-welfare of the many, life of the one, truth-
telling. And just as the choice between concealment and disclosure
requires the relative subordination of one of these three legal values, so
it also requires a precisely parallel subordination of one moral value to
another. To save Billy legally, we must subordinate administrative
transparency to individual right; to save Billy morally, we must value
innocent life over absolute truth-telling. It is worth noting that Captain
Vere's very name is truth, very close to the Latin root of verity and its
allied virtue, veracity.20 4 Melville has us on notice, in the most salient
possible way, that truth is in the balance.
Moral philosophers, of course, sometimes agonize over whether
truth is an absolute value; sadly, the letter of our law, particularly our
law governing lawyers, sometimes shares their befuddlement.205 But
moral people seldom agonize long, if at all, as the stories of our
heroes-historical, literary, and religious-all attest. Doubtlessly many a
Dutch family lied to Nazis to conceal Jews like Anne Frank's family;
Atticus, as we have seen, connived in a lie to hold Boo Radley harmless;
the Hebrew midwives lied to Pharaoh to frustrate his genocidal orders,
and the Scriptures of both Jews and Christians say God Himself
rewarded them munificently.20 6
As soon as we analyze Vere's case as a moral case, we see that it is
not a very hard case; just as we saw when we analyzed it as a legal case.
What is more, we see that it is, essentially, the same case, involving the
same choice among the same values. But that insight, in turn, raises a
series of related questions: Why, if it is such an easy case, did Vere not
get it right? Why, in fact, does he seem not even to have seen
concealment as an alternative at all? And why do we as readers, like
generations of scholars, not see it that way ourselves? To answer those
questions, we must look now, at the central problem: the Vere veer.
4. The Vere Veer
We have seen that Vere was, in general, an exemplary sea
commander. Yet we have also seen that, in the particular case of Billy
Budd and Claggart, he followed a course that was deeply morally and
204. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 175 n.58 (noting "his name, with
its echo of 'veritas' and 'verity."').
205. See William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 435, 460-61 (1999) (discussing a number of factors, such as privacy
interests, that may confer a certain degree of nobility to lying).
206. See Exodus 1:15-22 (Revised Standard).
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legally disturbing. Still worse, he had before him an alternative that was
both practically available and normatively superior. We are left to
wonder, in this Part, why Vere did not take that course. As Simon points
out, popular accounts of lawyers choosing justice over law are often
bildungsromans, coming-of-age stories of inexperienced, inflexible
characters maturing into more comprehensive and subtle visions of both
life and law.2 07 But Vere is an old seadog, not a young pup, and subtle,
sophisticated judgment, as we have seen, is an old trick he has long
mastered. Why, then, did he err so radically, and fatally, here?208
Vere's general character, Melville's narrator is careful to show us,
influences his actions at every point in Billy Budd's particular case. But
nowhere does he tell us how that general character is formed, and
nowhere does he indicate the source of this particular, skewing feature.
It is, however, the one characteristic that undermines, rather than
enhances, his performance as a sea officer. And, of course, it is the one
characteristic that both costs Billy Budd his life and leads his fellow
officers to question his sanity.
It seems, at bottom, the psychological equivalent of a powerful
thought experiment, employed by moral philosophers as great as Plato
and Kant.2 09 To identify the essence of moral goodness, one abstracts
away all thought of personal advantage. Although it may be useful, as
both a theoretical and practical matter, to distinguish the good from the
personally advantageous, it does not follow that the good is always that
which involves the maximum degree of personal disadvantage. Indeed, it
seems that, early in the Republic, Socrates is quite at pains to
demonstrate the opposite: What is really good is, at bottom, also what is
most personally advantageous.2 1 0 Vere, in starkest contrast, seems to
confuse the absence of self-interest with the presence of virtue, and
presence of personal injury as guarantee of disinterest.
And yet, at a deeper level of analysis, Vere's tropism toward self-
abnegation paradoxically involves a kind of second-order egoism.2 11 It
207. SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 95, at 94-95.
208. See Jami K. Elison, The Prosecution of Billy Budd (Ultra Vires of Positive Law), 35
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 57, 81 (1999) (calling for "public debate" to "inform prosecutorial and
judicial discretion."). James McBride, alluding to Elison's language, notes the absence of such "a
sense of 'prosecutorial and judicial discretion"' within Vere. See James McBride, Revisiting a
Seminal Text of the Law & Literature Movement: A Girardian Reading of Herman Melville's Billy
Budd, Sailor, 3 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 285, 285, 294 (2003).
209. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis
White Black trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1959) (1785).
210. PLATO, supra note 54, bk. I, at 33.
211. See Steven L. Winter, Melville, Slavery, and the Failure of the Judicial Process, 26
CARDOZO L. REv. 2471, 2485 (2005) (noting parallels between Vere's implicit "this hurts me more
than you" position and that of Melville's father-in-law, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme
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puts personal virtue above the good of not only the public in general, but
also particular individuals. From this perspective, what seems to matter
most to Vere is neither protecting the fleet nor saving Billy Budd, but
something more like "avoiding the appearance of impropriety."
There is no doubt that Vere genuinely suffers pain from his
decision. But there is an unmistakably sadomasochistic element about at
least some aspects of his suffering. At two critically painful junctures
that frame Vere's involvement in Billy's fate, Melville's narrator gives
us unmistakable hints of erotic excitement. When Vere ceases to stoop
over Claggart's inert body, described as being "like a dead snake," the
narrator describes Vere as "regaining erection." Immediately afterward,
he goes into the reverie from which emerges as the strict "military
disciplinarian." And, when Billy Budd, just about to the hoist to his
death, shouts "God bless Captain Vere" and the entire crew echoes that
shout, the narrator notes that "Captain Vere, either through stoic self-
control or a sort of momentary paralysis induced by emotional shock,
stood erectly rigid as a musket in the ship-armorer's rack."
What is more, we have good textual evidence that Vere's veer
toward the personally painful was not calculated, but entirely reflexive.
It seems to follow, not from a considered habit of mind, but from a
deeply engrained psychological tick. We have hardly a hint of his actual
mental process; all we know is that, just before turning from a fatherly to
a disciplinary mode toward Billy Budd and just before declaring to the
surgeon that Billy must die, the Captain went into a sort of private
reverie. The privacy of that reverie is particularly disturbing, both in
these two particular instances and as a matter of general moral decision-
making. In both instances, it cut him off from engaging in conversation
with those who might have counseled a better course of action; in
general, it involved a retreat from dialogue into what seems a
particularly neurotic form of self-reflection. What is more, an important
aspect of this retreat inward and away from dialogue is itself
symptomatic of the underlying problem. To share the problem with
others would seem like shirking; choosing to decide- by oneself places
the hardest decisions on one's own shoulders alone.
For all these reasons, Vere's inclination toward the personally
costly course of action, whether instinctual or habitual, seems to be
distinctly dangerous. From a republican perspective, the distancing of
oneself from dialogue is particularly dubious. It is, as a matter of
character, the sort of thing that should be, if at all possible, cured rather
than cultivated.
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, a notorious Northern enforcer of the infamous Fugitive Slave Act).
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B. In the Macrocosm of Christian Theology
What we have seen in the microcosm of ship suggests a parallel in
the macrocosm of the morality universe: As Vere was toward his little
shipboard world, so is God toward the world at large.2 12 This parallel is
quite clear in the text, particularly in the execution scene, and has been
analyzed in detail by many scholars.2 13 Here, as elsewhere, scholars have
reached diametrically opposed normative positions,2 14 generally
following their takes on Vere and the law. Some see the Christological
parallel as vindicating Vere and the law;2 15 others, as an almost cruelly
ironic parody. Most radically, some of Vere's critics take the parallel as
an implied criticism of Christian theology itself.2 16
This Part will take up that last possibility, based on the foregoing
analysis of Vere's character and actions. It will show that, in light of the
flaws in Vere's character that produce his fatal mistake in handling
Billy's case, we can see--quite possibly, are meant to see-flaws in the
entire system of Christian theology. God, like Vere, is an oddly over-
severe father. And yet, just as Vere is in many respects an admirably
excellent officer and gentleman, so, too, we can imagine a different but
ultimately appealing system of just such human beings goveming
the world.
1. The Implicit Critique of Orthodox Christianity
To see this parallel, let us begin with what is, perhaps, the most
widely known and quoted verse of the Christian Scriptures: "For God so
loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believeth in him
should not perish but have eternal life." 2 17 According to this crucial text,
212. But see Edwin M. Yoder, Fated Boy: Billy Budd and the Laws of War, 31 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 615, 620 (2000) ("What is flatly inconsistent with the text is to read Melville's representation
of a tragic but defensible act of military justice as an act of gratuitous cosmic cruelty.").
213. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 83 ("This story, which is often read as a retelling of the
story of Christ, is thus literally a cruci-fiction-a fiction structured in the shape of a cross.");
McWilliams, Innocent Criminal, supra note 202, at 78 ("The narrative thus transpires on two levels
simultaneously: the trial of William Budd, foretopman, and a modem reenactment of the Fall of
Man;" working this latter allegory shows "how thoroughly disillusioned Melville's religious views
have become"); see also Lawry, supra note 22, at 190 n.37 ("Melville's description of the sky at the
time of Billy's death makes him unmistakably a Christ-figure . . . ."); McBride, supra note 208, at
316 ("Melville's descriptions of Billy Budd are replete with allusions to the Christ figure.").
214. See Lawry, supra note 22, at 186 ("There is reason to think Melville's own attitude is
radically anti-Christian, mitigating a theory of justice based solely on atonement, although the story
itself is ... ambiguous on this (and my other) points.") (citation omitted).
215. Id. at 185 ("[P]erhaps the answer is yes, from the religious perspective, justice was done
in the case of Billy Budd.") (footnote omitted).
216. E.g., WEISBERG, POETHICS, supra note 91, at 114-16; see also RICHARD WEISBERG, THE
FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION, ch. 8 & 9 (1984).
217. John 3:16 (Revised Standard).
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the measure of God's love for humanity seems to be the extreme cost to
himself, his sacrifice of his own and only son. Vere, to ensure the safety
of his ship-and with his ship, the fleet, and with the fleet England, and
with England, the rule of law in the world-had to sacrifice his beloved
Billy, whom he knew to be morally innocent. So God, the Gospel of
John suggests, sacrificed his innocent and beloved son to save the world.
But, as we have seen, Vere's sacrifice of Billy seems, upon closer
inspection, to have been, not only practically unnecessary, but deeply
neurotically motivated. If our analysis is right, Vere may well have done
the wrong thing, because he analyzed the matter the wrong way. By
casting the sacrifice of Billy in unmistakably Christological terms,
Melville invites a parallel analysis of what seems the very core of
Christianity, God the Father's sacrifice of Christ the Son.
Having felt the moral wrong Vere wrought upon Billy Budd, we are
led to wonder, more generally: How can the sacrifice of an innocent ever
be the basis for salvation of the guilty? How can the symbolic Hebraic
and Hellenistic rituals of the scape-goatm be made effective by being
made literal, with Jesus as "the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of
the world!" 219 To the legal, as opposed to the theological or mytho-
poetic mind,220 this is not a balancing of accounts, but a serious
compounding of injustice.
We are led back to our more basic sense of this injustice by seeing
Christ's supposedly sacrificial death in a different but closely parallel
situation. We wonder why Vere, a basically virtuous and caring person,
does something so monstrous; we are tempted--quite literally,
tempted-to wonder why God did essentially the same thing. God, we
recognize, has much more latitude than Vere. Why is God, the source of
justice, bound by such an apparently perverse, inhumane justice?
2. Implicit Alternatives to Orthodox Christianity
This questioning leaves traditional Christian soteriology (the
"thesis" of traditional European religion) very much in doubt. This is, of
course, a very old and difficult problem for Christian theologians.22 1
218. See McBride, supra note 208, at 306 (describing the ritual of scapegoating in ancient
Israel and Greece).
219. John 1:29 (Revised Standard).
220. See generally McBride, supra note 208 (analyzing Billy Budd's death in terms of the
Rene Girard's theory of surrogate victims as the foundation of both religion and law as means of
restraining social violence).
221. See ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, Why God Became Man, in ANSELM OF CANTERBURY: THE
MAJOR WoRKs 260, 285 (Brian Davies & G.R. Evans eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (c. 1100)
("For, since God is so free that he is subject to no law and no judgement, and is so benevolent that
nothing can be conceived of more benevolent than he, and since there is nothing right or proper
11992019]
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Whether it can be worked out adequately, of course, is beyond the scope
of our discussion. We have no real sense, from Melville's text, as to
whether he thought such a resolution possible within the bounds of
traditional Christianity. But we do know, from his setting of his story in
the critical period of the French Revolution, that he meant to note that
the very foundation of European culture was, in a very real sense, called
into question. Thus we need to note that his critique offers, or at least
leaves open, three other possibilities. Each is more radical than its
predecessor, but none is a cosmic counsel of despair. The last, in fact, is
a counsel of very real hope: the universal rule of enlightened,
enlightening law at the hands of leaders of the kind we have seen
Captain Vere might well have been, or become.
a. Other Theisms
The least radical alternative would be non-Christian theism; this is
an alternative eminently ready-to-hand, at least as a matter of history and
theology. Christianity's odd soteriology, its insistence on the death of
God's innocent son to save guilty humanity, is a peculiarly "intramural"
problem, a problem that the other two great Abrahamist religions,
Judaism and Islam, completely avoid. Their God is also, perhaps
essentially, perfectly forgiving, and yet no innocent humans have to die
to propitiate him. Jesus said the Jews' God was his God; Muslims say
Jesus's God is theirs. Jesus saw himself coming to fulfill the Jewish law
and prophets; Islam takes him as a prophet of their own. Thus, it would
seem, only the God of Christians is the problem.
But only, it must be admitted, from a pre-modern perspective. As
the very names of the ships of the Revolutionary navy remind us, the
Enlightenment, especially in France, had launched a thorough-going
atheism onto the waters of European thought; by the end of the
eighteenth century, it had become part of a militant political movement.
except what he wishes, it does seem surprising that we should be saying that he is in no way willing
to forgive an injury to himself, or that it is not permissible for him to do so, whereas we are in the
habit of seeking forgiveness from him even for things we do to other people."); see also id. at 313
("How, then will man be saved, if he does not himself pay what he owes, and is bound not to be
saved if he does not pay? What effrontery it is on our part to assert that God, who is 'rich in mercy'
beyond human understanding, cannot do this merciful thing!" (citation omitted)); see also Lawry,
supra note 22, at 184 ("From the Christian perspective, Anselm of Canterbury argued that God
Himself had to find a way to escape the consequences of His justice which damned all men to death
via the sin of Adam's first disobedience. This justice conflicted with His merciful love. But love
itself is subject to justice. The solution? The underserved substitutional death of His Son, the God-
Man. Whatever its theological weaknesses, Anselm's theory of atonement has had a rich life in
Western Christianity, partly because it satisfies psychologically anyone who believes in a God of
love who is also a God of justice.") (citation omitted).
1200 [Vol. 47:1139
MELVILLE'S BILLY BUDD AND PLATO'S REPUBLIC
Melville has the Godly father-figure of his tale struck dead by a well-
aimed shot from the Revolution's Athie-Atheism.
b. French Atheism
This atheism, allied with if not inseparable from French
Revolutionary politics, is a second alternative to traditional
Christianity.222 It is not, we are told, a way open to Captain Vere: He
sees that, for all its promise of humanitarian reforms, it fails to take
account of basic elements in human nature, and thus will not be able to
establish itself in enduring forms. He thus opposes it, not out of narrow
self-interest or class interest, but from an informed regard for the
common good. From the perspective of the late nineteenth century, the
time of Melville's writing, Vere's pessimism might be said to have been
vindicated. Vere's generation already knew the Reign of Terror;
Melville himself knew Napoleon. Melville, indeed, warns his readers
that, sheltered by the distance of time and lulled by an outcome that
seems, in retrospect, inevitable, they might forget how, in Vere's time
and even after, all hung seriously in the balance:
That era appears measurably clear to us who look back at it, and but
read of it. But to the grandfathers of us graybeards, the more thoughtful
of them, the genius of it presented an aspect like that of Camoens' Spirit
of the Cape, an eclipsing menace mysterious and prodigious. At the
height of Napoleon's unexampled conquests, there were Americans who
had fought at Bunker Hill who looked forward to the possibility that the
Atlantic might prove no barrier against the ultimate schemes of this
French upstart from the revolutionary chaos who seemed in act of
fulfilling judgment prefigured in the Apocalypse.2 23
The "Preface" to earlier editions of Billy Budd make the
background of the French Revolution even more apparent:
The year 1797, the year of this narrative, belongs to a period which as
every thinker now feels, involved a crisis for Christendom not
exceeded in its undetermined momentousness at the time by any other
era whereof there is record. The opening proposition made by the
Spirit of that Age, involved the rectification of the Old World's
hereditary wrongs. In France, to some extent this was bloodily
effected. But what then? Straightway the Revolution itself became a
wrongdoer, one more oppressive than kings. Under Napoleon it
222. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 104 ("Even behind the martial order of the world of the
man-of-war, there lies a religious referent: the Bellipotent's last battle is with a French ship called
the Athed.").
223. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 21.
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enthroned upstart kings, and initiated that prolonged agony of
continual war whose final throe was Waterloo. During those years not
the wisest could have foreseen that the outcome of all would be what
to some thinkers apparently it has since turned out to be, a political
advance along nearly the whole line for Europeans. 224
Although current scholarship now sees this "Preface" as an
erroneous interpolation,22 no one questions that Melville wrote it or that
it expresses, albeit in less subtle form than the text's final version, his
sentiments about the significance of the background it describes.2 26
c. Anglo-American Law
Yet we have no reason to think that Melville liked Metternich any
better than Bonaparte; he places Vere, after all, in the navy of Europe's
most stable constitutional monarchy, not the service of the Emperor, the
Czar, or the Kaiser. Both Vere and Melville seem to have been on the
side, not of Continental reaction, but of Anglo-American reform.
Melville's narrator is at pains to point out that even the mutiny at the
Nore, the dark background against which Vere enacts his drama, led to
real reforms in England's own navy;2 2 7 Melville himself dedicated his
novella to a reform-minded English Captain under whom he himself
served aboard an American warship. The American Civil War, perhaps
more than anything else, moved Melville toward a greater appreciation
of the law. As McWilliams points out, "His volume of poems on the
Civil War is filled with welcoming references to the eventual 'victory of
law.,'228
That reform, bloody as it sometimes was, in Melville's day as in
Vere's, was essentially legal reform-incrementalist, not revolutionary;
cognizant of human imperfectability but not despairing of human
improvement. For it to work, what we need is a legal system-even if a
wholly secular legal system. For that system itself to work, to keep
congenital wolves like Claggart from devouring innocent if imperfect
lambs like Billy, we need capable shepherds like Vere. In the
macrocosm of the world, as in the microcosm of the ship, it need not be
the Lord who is our shepherd; it can also be, Melville suggests, the likes
224. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD 131 (Frederic Barron Freeman ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1948) [hereinafter "BELLY BUDD (Freeman ed.)"] (editor's footnotes omitted).
225. Hayford & Sealts, Introduction, supra note 14, at 16-19.
226. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 12 (contrasting England's "flag of founded law
and freedom defined" with "the enemy's red meteor of unbridled and unbounded revolt.").
227. Id. at 11- 13.
228. McWilliams, Innocent Criminal, supra note 202, at 77 (citing this as evidence of
Melville's shift from an early emphasis on natural, individual rights to his later "pro-law position").
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of Captain Vere. In a very real sense, then, the solution to the fallen
condition of the world, not just the threatened state of HMS Bellipotent,
is the kind of Captain who has learned Melville's lesson about the Vere
veer, writ large as well as small.2 29
3. Summary
If the human tragedy of Billy Budd can make us see, descriptively,
the parallel with Christ's death, then it can also suggest that God's
judgment in that case, like Vere's in Billy's, can be judged, normatively,
in human terms. We can imagine a better fate for Billy Budd because we
can imagine Vere's being-blasphemous though it may sound when
bluntly stated-better than God, where better simply means more
fatherly, more humane. And we can imagine this because we can
imagine human law being superior to the kind of divine law that would
demand the unnecessary sacrifice of the innocent. God, in the case of
Christ, like Vere in Billy's case, could have followed the example of
Atticus in Boo Radley's case. And so, in our governance of the world at
large, may we, if we honor the spirit of the law by the breach of its letter.
The key, in the macrocosm as in the microcosm, is agents of the law
who can implement the law in that paradoxical way.
IV. MELVILLE AND PLATO: BILLYBUDD 'S REPUBLICAN READING
If my analysis in Part III is correct, then an "improved" Captain
Vere would be, not only the ideal naval commander in a world where the
navy is the bulwark of the rule of law, but also the ideal agent of the law
in a world where law is not merely the metaphorical hand of Providence,
but its virtual replacement. He would be, as I have said, something
approaching a philosopher-king; by extrapolation from his microcosmic
world to our macrocosm, our high-level agents of the law would be as
well. That, in turn, would make improving Vere, removing his tragic
flaw, a vital public policy imperative.
But this imperative poses twin paradoxes. First, the medium that
brings us to see his flaw, Melville's novella and other works of that
genre, are not readily available to Vere himself or to others like him,
precisely because of who they are. They are intensely serious-minded
229. Cf. Lawry, supra note 22, at 186-87. Lawry suggests that we need more than moral
analysis if we are to fulfill, not just our obligations, but also our aspirations. He suggests help from a
higher source-if not God, "then perhaps from a luminous work of art" like Rilke's sonnet Torso of
an Archaic Apollo and, beyond that, Rilke's last words: "You must change your life." I suggest that
the source is that to which the sonnet points us, that in light of which we are to examine and change
our lives, the whole of the Western tradition, seen as the source of its law. See Lawry, supra note
22, at 186-87, n.40.
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leaders, whose very serious-mindedness leads them to shun "fluffy,"
self-indulgent stuff like fiction in favor of more meaty reading material.
This is, of course, only a special case of the Vere veer, but one with very
severe general consequences. This particular veer directs Vere and his
ilk away from the very reading that, if Melville is right, would protect
them from many another veer, some of them predictably disastrous.
The second paradox flows from this first. If reading works like Billy
Budd would make men like Vere better leaders, then, for that very
reason, that reading is what Plato calls for in the Republic; indeed, it is
the kind of reading that the Republic itself is. And yet, it is the very kind
of reading that Book X of the Republic seems to ban, with "baby-and-
the-bathwater" overbreadth.
In this final Part, then, we need to unpack the twin paradoxes of
Vere's reading. Subpart A looks at how Vere's reading ironically
excludes both Plato and Melville, giving the two of them a double
common ground.23 0 Beyond that common ground, we will see in Subpart
B they differ on three basic issues, but Melville's resolution of those
differences is itself deeply Platonic.23 1 That will prepare us, then, in the
final Subpart, to see Billy Budd as Melville's republican answer to
the Republic.2 32
A. Finding Plato and Melville's Common Ground. Excluded Educators
Reading, Melville's narrator makes clear, was a fundamental part of
Vere's life: "He had a marked leaning toward everything intellectual"; in
particular, "[h]e loved books, never going to sea without a newly
replenished library, compact but of the best."23 3 What's more, his
reading had a profound effect upon his outlook:
In this line of reading he found confirmation of his own more reserved
thoughts-confirmation which he had vainly sought in social converse,
so that as touching most fundamental topics, there had got to be
established in him some positive convictions, which he forefelt would
abide in him essentially unmodified so long as his intelligent part
remained unimpaired .... His settled convictions were as a dyke
against those invading waters of novel opinion social, political and
otherwise, which carried away as in a torrent no few minds in those
days, minds by nature not inferior to his own.234
230. See infra Part IV.A.
231. See infra Part IV.B.
232. See infra Part IV.C.
233. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 18.
234. Id.
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Given the importance of Vere's reading in shaping his character
and convictions, the narrator is at pains to show us, with considerable
particularity, what he read, and why:
With nothing of that literary taste which less heeds the thing conveyed
than the vehicle, his bias was toward those books to which every
serious mind of superior order occupying any active post of authority
in the world, naturally inclines: books treating of actual men and
events no matter what era-history, biography, and unconventional
writers, like Montaigne, who, free from cant and convention, honestly
and in the spirit of common sense philosophize upon realities.235
These choices, we shall see, are as significant for what they exclude as
for what they include.
1. The Paradoxical Exclusions
Two omissions are immediately apparent: books like Melville's
Billy Budd and Plato's Republic. On the one hand, "natural" leaders of
Vere's sort incline to histories and biographies, books about "actual men
and events"; not, by implication, fiction, tales of invented characters and
imagined events. On the other hand, leaders like Vere incline to the
works of writers who philosophize about such real events; not, again by
implication, imagined dialogues aimed at establishing
ideal commonwealths.
Thus each of the two headings of Vere's readings, "nonfiction"
narratives and "worldly" philosophy, omits two very real possibilities,
which are both classically important and intimately connected: fiction
that reveals "truth" about "actual men and events" and philosophy, "free
from cant and convention," that is in the form of fiction. Both of these
excluded alternatives, we should notice, are "internal narratives" in ways
that the accounts Vere prefers cannot be. This takes us back to both the
subtitle of the novella and to the first clause in Melville's critical
sentence: Vere's preference, natural but possibly misplaced, for
substance over form, and his apparent failure to see that these two, too,
may be more intimately related than he realizes.
2. The Necessary Education
In this very important respect, then, Melville and Plato stand, at the
outset of the Vere's story, on common ground: exclusion from the
shaping of the central character. In their respective understandings of




affirmative common ground. Vere, the narrator tells us, reads what all
great leaders are naturally inclined to read. Melville strongly suggests, as
I argued in Part III, that Vere's is the stuff of which leaders are made.236
But this inclination on the part of leaders, though "natural," is
problematic; Melville names it, not merely an inclination, but, more
skeptically, a bias. In many, if not most, analyses of the Billy Budd, Billy
represents nature and Vere, culture,237 and we are invited to choose one
over the other, to lament or accept, with Melville, their inevitable and
tragic incompatibility. The quoted passage about Vere's natural
inclinations to certain books suggests both that the distinction between
nature and nurture is not that sharp, and that Melville may believe the
apparent conflict between them can be modulated.
This is because the cultured themselves have a "nature" of their
own, and it is a nature that itself needs cultivating. That, of course, is
what a large part of the Republic,2 38 if not the whole of it, is designed not
only to show, but also to accomplish, even as it is, on this analysis, the
conclusion toward which Vere's story points us.
The immediate reason for this paradox is the intimate relationship
between the nature and nurture, the inclination and education, of leaders.
Such people incline toward reading, and reading of certain kinds of
books; reading, especially the kinds of books they read, makes them who
they are. Vere's character, as we have seen, had a literally fatal flaw; that
fatal flaw, we need to see now, is both related to his reading and curable
by it. What Vere read made him good, but not quite good enough; what
he didn't read might have made him better, maybe even good enough to
save Billy Budd.
B. Reconciling Plato and Melville's Diferences
As we have seen, Melville shows us how Vere's reading shaped
and confirmed his character. Plato and Melville implicitly agree, then,
that the character of leaders needs to be shaped, and that reading can
radically shape that character. Beyond those admittedly basic points,
however, Melville reveals three points of apparently radical
236. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 82 ("Vere, then, is an honest, serious reader, seemingly
well suited for the role of judge and witness that in the course of the story he will come to play.").
237. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 19, at 128, 131; see also Weisberg's ressentiment argument,
supra note 21, at 2223-29. But cf. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 155-65
(criticizing Weisberg's position).
238. PLATO, supra note 54, bk. II, mII, at 54-95. We see this perhaps most acutely at the
beginning of Book X as Socrates struggles to boldly confront his own nature, a nature deeply
impressed by the words of Homer, a poet for whom Plato possessed admiration, but whose authority
was now being challenged. See id. bk. X, at 277.
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disagreement. In the profoundly pregnant sentence that describes Vere's
readings, Melville shows us three vital omissions, omissions that
significantly limit Vere's insights into the character of both others and
himself: traditional religious texts, particularly the Bible; imaginative
literature, particularly fictional narratives; and empirical social science,
especially sociology and psychology.
In this section we will examine these omitted readings, and what
they might have told Vere about others and about himself. We will also
examine why Vere omitted these readings: Vere's veer itself. We will
see, explicitly at some points, implicitly at others, that Melville raises the
prospect that the problem is the triumph of a particularly modem attitude
with very ancient roots, a fundamentally flawed rationalism traceable
back to Plato himself. We will see that Melville offers in Billy Budd two
vital correctives to this kind of Platonism, traditional religious texts and
his own narrative fiction. And yet what he presents is not a refutation of
Plato, but a Platonic answer. It is not too much to say that Billy Budd is
Melville's new Republic. The point is not merely that Billy Budd may be
read from a "real" republican perspective, but that it may, in fact, be a
really republican text.
And yet, as we shall see, it is an answer with problems of its own.
In particular, in his revulsion against the pseudo-scientific psychology of
his day, Melville rejects a source of insight that, although not essential in
resolution of the particular case he presents, would, if generalized,
seriously undermine the insights that literature can offer law. In this Part,
we take up each of these omitted readings in turn. Each, we shall see, is
one aspect of Melville's argument with Plato; in each, Melville answers
Plato on terms that take us beyond a conventional understanding of Plato
to positions nevertheless completely consistent with, if not required by,
Plato's Republic.
1. The Problem of Radical Evil in the Christian Scriptures and the
Greco-Roman Classics
As we have seen, a principal challenge to leaders like Captain Vere
and, more generally, to the law of the civilization they serve, is to protect
innocents like Billy Budd from villains like Claggart. Had Vere seen
Claggart for what he was, he might well have averted the fatal
confrontation between him and Billy that precipitated his own crisis of
conscience. He certainly mistrusted Claggart, as we have seen. But he
did not fathom, until too late, if ever, the full depths of his depravity.
The reason for this oversight, the narrator implies, is that Claggart's
character is not accessible by the means most ready to the hands of men
like Vere. They, he has told us, have a wide, worldly knowledge
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garnered from their own experience and supplemented with their
eminently practical reading. That, the narrator says he himself once
thought, should suffice: "knowledge of the world assuredly implies the
knowledge of human nature, and in most of its varieties.,,2 39 Here,
however, he reports having been contradicted long ago by "an honest
scholar my senior."240 Scholars of Melville generally associate that
anonymous scholar with Melville himself;241 whoever Melville meant us
to take him to be, he means for us to take his reply seriously. Here it is:
Yes, but a superficial knowledge of it [human nature], serving
ordinary purposes. But for anything deeper, I am not certain
whether to know the world and to know human nature be not
two distinct branches of knowledge, which while they may
coexist in the same heart, yet either may exist with little or
nothing of the other. Nay, in an average man of the world, his
constant rubbing with it blunts that finer spiritual insight
indispensable to the understanding of the essential in certain
exceptional characters, whether evil ones or good.24 2
His prime example is a worldly-wise lawyer: "In a matter of some
importance I have seen a girl wind an old lawyer about her
little finger.24 3
How then, to fathom such exceptional-and exceptionally
dangerous-characters? The old scholar's suggestion raises as many
questions as it answers, for his narrator and for Melville and his readers,
as much for what he rejects and as for what he recommends. He declares
himself "the adherent of no organised religion much less of any
philosophy built into a system."244 More than that, he rejects the pillars
of English legal thought and looks beyond them to a most unlikely
source of enlightenment: "Coke and Blackstone hardly shed so much
light into obscure spiritual places as the Hebrew prophets. And [they
were] [m]ostly recluses."245 Only they, he comes close to saying, offer
useful insights into such as this, insights inaccessible to the law's Coke
and Blackstone and to other sophisticated men of the world-men,
presumably, like Vere's revered Montaigne.
239. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 27.
240. Id.
241. See Hayford & Sealts, Introduction, supra note 14, at 38; see also Harrison Hayford &
Merton M. Sealts, Jr., Notes & Commentary on BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 183 [hereinafter
Hayford & Sealts Notes & Commentary].
242. MELVILLE,BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 27-28.
243. Id. at 28.
244. Id. at 27.
245. Id. at 28.
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But Melville's narrator explicitly balks at the biblical, much less
Calvinistic, comparison, noting that it will alienate the readers of his
day.2 46 For their conviction, he insists, "one must turn to some authority
not liable to the charge of being tinctured with the biblical element."24 7
That alternative authority is none other than Plato. "In a list of
definitions included in the authentic translation of Plato, a list
attributable to him, occurs this: 'Natural Depravity: a depravity
according to nature."24 8 Three things about this definition are notable.
First, for all its purported authenticity, it is a mere attribution, and almost
certainly a false one. As Hayford and Sealts point out, it does not appear
in later nineteenth-century translations of Plato;2 49 it seems most likely a
scholarly gloss, the importation into Plato of an idea alien to him.
This raises a second point: The pseudo-Platonic definition is, as a
matter of form, decidedly circular, and hence non-Platonic. As other
scholars have pointed out, the definition "'Natural Depravity: a
depravity according to nature,'-is in fact, as F. B. Freeman points out,
nothing but a tautology. Syntactically, the definition fulfills its function,
but it is entirely empty of any cognitive information."2 50 This sort of
circular definition, of course, is precisely the sort of reasoning that the
Platonic Socrates constantly deflates and ridicules in the Dialogues.
And, even as the definition's form is anti-Platonic, so, even more
significantly, is the substance of what it attempts to define. That brings
us to the third and final point: The natural depravity that Melville shows
us in Claggart is not only lacking in the Platonic canon;25 1 it is, itself,
ultimately anti-Platonic, the very reverse of the virtue commended most
particularly in the Republic for both the individual and the
commonwealth. The narrator not only declares Claggart to be "the direct
reverse of a saint"; he also shows him to be the antithesis of a
246. See id. at 28 ("[O]ne must turn to some authority not liable to the charge of being
tinctured with the Biblical element."); id. at 29 ("savor of Holy Writ ... little will it commend these
pages to many a reader of to-day."). See also Eric Goldman, Bringing Out the Beast in Melville's
Billy Budd: The Dialogue of Darwinian and "Holy" Lexicons on Board the Bellipotent, 37 STUD.
IN THE NOVEL 430, 438 (2005) ("Melville opens a quarrelsome dialogue with his readers about the
proper language with which to describe his characters."). For Goldman, this quarrel is between the
traditional, transcendental language of free will and the modern, Darwinian language of scientific
determinism; for me, this debate is between the Hebraic and Platonic conceptions of radical evil.
247. MELVILLE,BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 28.
248. Id.
249. Hayford & Sealts, Notes & Commentary, supra note 241, at 162.
250. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 94 (internal citations omitted).
251. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 86, bk. VII, at 176 ("In fact, Socrates was completely
opposed to the view (that a man may know what is right but do what is wrong) . . .").
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philosopher.25 2 The hallmark of his depravity, the narrator tells us,
is this:
[T]hough the man's even temper and discreet bearing would seem to
intimate a mind peculiarly subject to the law of reason, not the less in
heart he would seem to riot in complete exemption from that law,
having apparently little to do with reason further than to employ it as
an ambidexter implement for effecting the irrational.253
Precisely this is the case with Claggart, "in whom was the mania of
an evil nature, not engendered by vicious training or corrupting books or
licentious living, but born with him and innate, in short 'depravity
according to nature.",
2 5 4
The narrator's "old friend" does a double duty. On the one hand, he
distances the narrator himself from the taint of a theory both alien to
classical Platonism and offensive to modern sensibility: Augustinian
Christianity's doctrine of radical evil. On the other hand, however, he
puts the narrator formally in the very most orthodox of Platonic
positions: dialogue with a friend about things that really matter, human
good and its opposite. And, in so doing, Melville brings the two great
Western normative traditions into active dialogue with each other.
That dialogue dramatically introduces a metaphysical notion,
radical evil, that is a notoriously significant theme for Melville,2 55 a
theme the re-discovery of which he himself attributes to the work of his
mentor, Hawthorne, a likely source for his narrator's "old scholar."25 6
But, having seen this "metaphysical" difference between Plato and
Melville, we are left with an obvious epistemological problem: How do
we know Melville is right? As we have seen, Melville's narrator invokes
the Hebrew prophets, and the western religious tradition more generally,
as evidence of the existence of radically evil rational natures. But that is
more by way of introduction than proof. He purports to supplement hat,
for "modern" tastes, with Plato; as we have seen, though, this is very
dubious Plato indeed.
What we are left with is a strange but significant double source.
Within the story, the narrator tells us that he came to appreciate radical
evil only-very significantly-in dialogue with an older, wiser friend. It
252. See MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 27-29.
253. Id. at 28.
254. Id. at 29.
255. Id. at 27-28.
256. In commenting on Hawthorne's work, Melville had observed, "in certain moods, no man
can weigh this world, without throwing in something, somehow like Original Sin, to strike the
uneven balance." Hayford & Sealts, Notes & Commentary, supra note 241, at 143 (citing Melville's
essay "Hawthorne and his Mosses" (1850)).
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was that friend, in turn, who pointed him to the peculiar insights of the
Hebrew prophets. But that friend himself did not rely, ultimately, on
those very prophets. Instead, he confirmed their findings with his own
experience; he saw a mere girl deceive a worldly-wise lawyer, the
paragon of sophisticate insight into human nature. But that, in turn,
raises a final question: Why was the old friend's experience a better
source of insight than the lawyer's? Because, we are led to assume, he
was himself like the prophets, not like the lawyer. He, like the prophets,
was a recluse, an acute observer of the world at a proper degree of
remove, not one whose sensitivity has been dulled by too much rubbing
up against that very world.
Outside the story, as readers of the story, we ourselves have just
such a source. We have the narrator, informed by his dialogue with his
old friend, informing us of his old friend's insights. This, of course, is
the structure of every Platonic dialogue; someone who purports to have
had the conversation within the dialogue-sometimes Socrates himself,
sometimes one of his interlocutors-purports to relate the content of that
dialogue to us. We are, as James Boyd White has pointed out, invited to
engage, in our turn, with that narrator in a dialogue of our own, in which
he stands to us as Socrates does to his interlocutors within the
dialogue.257 But, of course, it is Plato who "really" recounts the dialogue,
even as, in the novella Billy Budd, it is Melville who is telling us the
story through the fictitious narrator. What he tells us, ultimately, is what
Plato, through his dialogues, also tells us: You must credit these things
on the basis of the narrative itself; "the resumed narrative must be left to
vindicate, as it may, its own credibility."2 58 When he tells us that,
however, he has presented us with a very distinctive narrative indeed.
2. Melville's Novella, Plato's Dialogues, and the
Banning of "Poets."
But this raises an even more fundamental problem: Melville's own
medium, fiction. Enlightenment doesn't come to Vere from his two
preferred sources, factual narratives and "worldly" philosophy. And it
comes to the narrator through two other sources, one outside the
Classical tradition, and one very much within it: on the one hand, the
Bible; on the other, a dialogue with an old friend and scholar. It comes to
257. See cf. James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern
Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 870-71 (1983) (contrasting rhetoric, which carries as its goal
persuasion, to dialectic, which carries as its goal "to engage each person at the deepest level").
258. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 29; see also id. at 49 (directing readers to
determine the issue of Vere's sanity "by such light as this narrative may afford").
2019] 1211
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
us, however, through a third medium, which is neither accessible to Vere
nor apparently palatable to Plato: narrative fiction. For any writer who is
engaged, as Melville clearly was, with the deep sources of Western
culture, the ultimate anxiety of influence is not directed within,
intramurally, toward one's fellow "poets," in his case, masters like
Hawthorne.2 59 It is, rather, directed extra-murally toward philosophy,
ultimately, toward Plato's banning of the poets from his republic in
Book X of The Republic.
In this Subpart, then, we need to see how Melville engages Plato on
matters of form as well as substance, epistemology as well as
metaphysics. As we shall see, Melville may not so much refute Plato's
ban on poets from the Republic as present the kind of poetry that shores
up, rather than undermines, the Republic itself. What saves Billy Budd
from the ban of Book X is precisely what saves the Republic itself from
its own prohibition of poets.
Plato's famous banning of the poets,260 remember, is provisional: If
they can prove, philosophically, why they should not be banned, then
they will be welcomed back into his regime, where philosophers are
kings and philosophy, law. 2 6 1 The reason for the banishment is twofold.
Poetry has two related failings, one mostly descriptive, the other mostly
normative: It is untruthful and it is corrupting. We need to look next at
Melville's implicit answer to each objection.
a. Fiction and Truth
The first objection that Socrates raises to "poetry" is a descriptive
failing: What poets show us is thrice removed from reality, essentially
only a picture of a reflection of the real.262 And yet, of course, Plato's
own dialogues have, paradoxically, just such a fictional form. Just as
Plato recounts the conversation with Socrates in an unmistakably
fictional form, so Socrates himself, within the dialogue, narrates
accounts that are themselves not factually true. Indeed, immediately
259. But cf. HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE 8 (1973) (focusing on "intra-poetic
relationships as parallels of family romance.").
260. PLATO, supra note 54, bk. X, at 277-91; see also id. bk. I, at 61 (forbidding speeches
about the gods); id. bk. III, at 70 (forbidding certain speeches about bad human beings "for fear that
they sow a strong proclivity for badness in our young.").
261. Id. bk. X, at 291 ("All the same, let it be said that, if poetry directed to pleasure and
imitation have any argument to give showing that they should be in a city with good laws, we
should be delighted to receive them back from exile, since we are aware that we ourselves are
charmed by them.").
262. Id. bk. X, at 278-82.
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after defending the ban on fiction in Book X, Socrates goes on to recount
the transparently non-historical "Myth of Ur." 2 6 3
For the Republic itself to survive this objection, raised in the
Republic itself, Plato must be doing implicitly what Aristotle spells out
explicitly in his Poetics, namely, showing how, in the latter's words:
[P]oetry is something more philosophical and more highly serious than
history, for poetry tends to express universals, history particulars. By
universal is meant what a man of a certain sort will say or do, either
probably or inevitably; and this is what poetry aims at, despite the
particular names it employs. 264
What makes fiction more philosophical is its ability to show us
characters and events in their essence and according to their types, not
limited by the messy accidents of their actual development and
occurrence. In their greater freedom to create their own characters and
situations, poets can create, as it were, laboratory examples or models of
what they would have us see.
There is another potential advantage of fiction over history, much
advanced by the contemporary law and literature movement. Historical
accounts tend to be "external" accounts (or, in the case of
autobiography, notoriously tendentious); fiction can take us inside its
characters, allowing us to inhabit their lives as if they were our own.2 6 5
Significantly, Melville subtitled Billy Budd "An Inside Narrative." There
is, of course, an Aristotelian analogue here, his notion in the Poetics that
a vital function of tragedy is catharsis, an identification with the
characters' suffering that lets us purge ourselves of our own emotions.2 66
But it is important to distinguish the Aristotelian catharsis from the
contemporary law and literature movement's emphasis on empathy. As
we shall see in the next Subpart, empathy may be much more compatible
with Plato's more basic stricture on poetry: not only that it is inaccurate,
but also that it is corrupting.
263. Id. bk. X, at 297-303. In Bloom's translation, the story begins with the most basic
fictional self-disclosure: "Once upon a time ..... See id. bk. X, at 297.
264. ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF POETRY 302 (Philip Wheelwright trans., Odyssey Press 18th
prtg. ed. 1977) (335 B.C.E.) [hereinafter ART OF POETRY]. Melville also reminds us, rather
mischievously at the end of the novella, that fiction may be more historical than history, at least
official history. In the case of the official account of the incident aboard the Bellipotent, guilt and
innocence are again reversed, with Claggart vindicated and Billy Budd vilified. See MELVILLE,
BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 70.
265. See Rob Atkinson, What Is It Like to Be Like That? The Progress of Law and Literature's
"Other" Project, 43 STUD. L. POL. & SoC'Y 21,35-39 (2008) [hereinafter Atkinson, What Is It Like
to Be Like That?].
266. ART OF POETRY, supra note 264, at 296.
12132019]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
b. Fiction and Education.
Here, then, is a deeper philosophical challenge. Plato objects to
poetry only secondarily and derivatively because it is inaccurate or
counterfactual; he objects primarily and ultimately because it is
corrupting, and corrupting of precisely the audience, leaders of the
republic, whom he believes it ought to be strengthening. So, even as
Aristotle challenges Vere's attitude toward literature within the book, as
a character in the novella whom spurns fiction, so Plato challenges
Melville's attitude outside the book, as a would-be educator of
republican leaders whom deals in fictitious narratives.
Plato is quite explicit about how the descriptive limitations of
poetry lead to its more basic normative failure. Poets do not see the real
essence of human experience; they only see the superficial, particularly
the actual importance people attach to pleasure and pain, and they make
that the norm, implying that we not only tend to, but should, seek
pleasure and avoid pain. Unable to see more deeply into the human
condition, they satisfy themselves with depicting what is easier both to
see and to imitate: the experience of pleasure and pain.26 7 In so doing,
they work a double harm: on the one hand, awaking and nourishing that
part in us that is sensitive to pleasure and pain, even as, on the other
hand, they weaken the more discerning, rational part.2 68
This latter is the very faculty, according to Plato, that reveals to
philosophers the ultimate moral truth, the truth that poets miss: The real
harm that befalls humans is not to suffer the painful accidents of fate, but
to do injustice. In so doing, poets weaken the very capacity to see
beyond pleasure and pain to the truer essence of goodness and virtue.2 69
Worst of all, poets corrupt he best of humans, by making them feel the
pain of the virtuous depicted as the ultimate bad, and to praise that
depiction as the highest art.270
i. Good Models and Bad
All this, it is important to see, is ironically reversed in Vere's case:
He "veers" away from, not toward, the pleasurable. Rather than
associating the good with pleasure, the path the poets recommend, he
associates the good, or at least the morally right course, with pain. But
this involves a basic misunderstanding: If pain and pleasure are things
accidental, not essential, to virtue, then neither the absence of one nor
267. PLATO, supra note 54, bk. X, at 290.
268. Id. bk. X, at 288-90.
269. Id. bk. X, at 290-91.
270. Id.
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the presence of the other will necessarily indicate the way to either virtue
or vice. This is, of course, a sophomoric sort of mistake, one that
Socrates's most conscientious interlocutors make very near the
beginning of the Republic. In Book II, they point out to Socrates that the
multitude sees virtue as a kind of drudgery value for its results but
bothersome in itself; Socrates is at pains to show them that virtue is not
that sort of thing at all.2 7 1 They learn that lesson in the rest of the
Republic; they become prototypes of properly educated leaders. Vere, in
Melville's story, does not learn that lesson, and his leadership results in
great and unnecessary harm, to himself and to another.
His story, then, does not show us what Plato objects to in poetry,
the hero experiencing accidental loss, and the attendant pain, as the
ultimate harm, and the poet inviting us to indulge with the hero in his
grief. Rather, Melville shows us, on our analysis in Part III, a leader who
fails because he fundamentally misunderstands the meaning of virtue,
life according to reason, not pleasure and pain, and the way that that
meaning is ascertained, through reasoned dialogue with one's
philosophic friends, those who share mutual concern for the virtue of
each other's souls.
Melville, then, turns the poet's error on its head. His philosopher-
king, Captain Vere, suffers, not from extraneous catastrophes, but from a
disaster that is, at bottom, his own failure as philosopher-king qua
philosopher-king. Billy Budd's death is not an accident; it is the product
of Vere's own failed leadership. What we have in his case, then, is not a
hero brought low by "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune," but
by his own fundamental failure as a philosopher king, his failure to live
and govern by the light of dialogic reason.
Beyond that, Vere's story also answers Plato in four other
significant ways, ways equally consistent with Plato's own position. The
first of these has to do with the role of the feminine in matters of
governance, the second with the absolutely fundamental role of dialogue
in discerning the path of virtue, the third with the relationship between
truthfulness and other virtues, and the fourth with the relationship of
proper republican poetry and its rivals..
ii. The Female, the Effeminate, and the Ideal
On the first point, the role of the feminine, Melville offers a
reconciliation of Plato's gender egalitarianism in Book V and his




women with the proper virtues should rule the republic alongside
similarly-constituted men;2 in the latter, Plato objects to the poets'
making the republic's rulers womanishly emotional.27 3
As other commentators have argued, Vere's failure to "be in touch
with his feminine side" contributes significantly to his failure of
leadership. By relegating the universal human inclinations of mercy and
individuated justice to the stereotypically suspect feminine side, Vere
effectively eliminates their potentially benign influence in Billy's case.
At trial, he is very specific about this, and very negative: "Well, the heart
here, sometimes the feminine in man, is as that pitious woman [who
bewails the fate of a kinsman at trial], and hard though it be she must
here be ruled out." 27 4
What the narrator has us imagine in Vere's final interview with
Billy, however, is a very different image of masculinity, the loving,
empathetic father as opposed the stem military disciplinarian. And, as
we have seen, it is precisely as that kind of father that Vere first
responded to Billy's striking of Claggart; only is it when the stem
military disciplinarian displaces that kind of fatherliness that Vere makes
his tragic veer. It is that rigorous, inflexible, stereotypical masculinity
that Vere himself elevates over the equally stereotypical soft and
emotionally overwrought feminine. His oral argument at to the court
recommends the former over that latter; by that time, however, his own
unthinking, reflexive turn from a more nuanced masculine role has led
him into precisely this false dilemma.
Had he been more menschly and less macho, he would have made a
much better captain; what he had properly to fear was not the truly
feminine, but the stereotypically effeminate. Had he been a better
balance of the properly masculine and feminine, more fatherly, he might
have decided better. (And, of course, we are free to believe that his
martial domain would gain, rather than lose, from female officers, even
as Plato foresaw for his republic, with its female philosopher-kings.)
iii. The Centrality of Dialogue
With respect to the role of dialogue, Melville's implicit answer to
Plato goes even closer to the heart of Vere's problem. As we have seen,
at every pivotal point in Vere's related "veers" from virtuous decision-
making, he closes himself off in a private reverie of thought; at none of
these points does he discuss his dilemma with anyone else. As James
272. PLATO, supra note 54, bk. V, at 129-36.
273. See generally id. bk. X, at 289.
274. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 55.
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Boyd White points out in analyzing Plato's Gorgias, most Platonic
dialogues end in a failed dialogue that shows us, the readers of the
dialogue, how things might have gone better.27 5 In Billy Budd, dialogue
fails at an even deeper level; it never occurs at all, it never gets a chance
to go awry, to wrongly veer, because it never gets underway in the first
place. Part of Vere's damaging, damning tropism is his inclination, at
precisely the point of vital decision, to "veer" from dialogue into reverie,
from friendly discourse to private reflection.
This, in turn, seems the most significant and troubling part of his
tropism: When it comes to the hardest decision, how to decide, he
automatically takes the most lonely, and presumably most apparently
difficult, route. His tropism, that is, takes him not only to bad decisions,
but to the very kind of process that is likely to produce substantively bad
decisions. In fact, the worst aspect of Vere's flaw is that it takes him
away from reasoned dialogue. As the narrator's remembered dialogue
with his old friend reminds us, it might have been otherwise; dialogue
can turn one from a dangerous wrong course to a truer and better one.
And yet this very failure, or meta-failure, of dialogue within the
text, as James Boyd White shows elsewhere,27 6 tends to produce a
double dialogue outside the text, about the text, between us and Vere on
the one hand and between us and Melville on the other. In the first, we
take up Billy's case against Vere; in the second, we take up, in dialogue
with the narrator, Vere's own case. Billy Budd, of course, has generated
the most spirited of such dialogues for three-quarters of a century.
iv. The Subordination of Truth to Justice
One basic truth that that sort of dialogue reveals, in both the
Republic explicitly and Billy Budd implicitly, is the relationship of truth-
telling to other virtues. As we have seen, Plato objects to fiction because
it tends to misstate the truth about human experience, to present
experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain as the twin goals of human
existence. It is important to recall, however, the nature of Plato's
objection to this alleged untruth. For one thing, it is accidentally untrue;
it is not so much a lie as a mistake, an error. For another, it is
objectionable not so much in itself, as for what it causes: poor training of
those who might otherwise become proper philosopher-kings. What
Plato explicitly allows, and what Melville implicitly practices, is the
reversal of these two objectionable elements of fiction: Telling literal
untruths to instill genuine virtue in the leaders of the republic.




Plato proposes precisely this possibility in the early section of the
Republic explicitly devoted to the education of its guardians. To train
proper leaders, to enlist them in a genuinely meritocratic aristocracy, we
must, Socrates says, tell them an admittedly dubious myth about the
random "natural" distribution of talents.27 7 What makes this myth
acceptable, despite its admitted lack of factual foundation, is exactly the
criterion that makes poetry suspect: Its educational effect on the
guardian class. On the one hand, the Republic's "meritocratic" myth is
presented as essential to producing philosopher-kings; on the other hand,
what Socrates objects to in conventional poetry is that it demoralizes
those very philosopher-kings.27 8 More generally, Plato is quite clear that
the guardians themselves must sometimes lie to protect the republic,27 9
even as we have said Vere should have lied both to avert mutiny and
save Billy Budd.
Here again, then, Melville with Billy Budd doubly reflects Platonic
strictures. In the novella, he gives future Veres an edifying cautionary
tale of how not to make fundamental decisions, decisions about justice.
Inside the novella, he shows how the more just course would have
involved a virtuous lie, a cover-up of the real truth about Claggart's
death. This is the very sort of lie that Plato himself recommends to his
guardians to use in just such a situation; this the very sort of story that
the Republic itself is.
v. Proper Poetry Over Its Rivals
Finally, as a more purely formal matter, Melville seems to affirm
another of Plato's challenges to his poetic opponents. As we saw at the
outset of this subsection, Plato's banning of the poets is only
provisional; if they can show how they can meet his standards for
republican poetry, they will be welcomed back. And he also allows for
"friends of poetry" to make a case for poetry, in their own, non-
metrical idiom.
Melville, as we have seen, has done the latter, even as Plato himself
does it in the Republic itself. But Melville, no mean poet himself, may
have done the former as well, in Plato's words, "made an apology in
lyrics or in some other meter."2 8 0 Billy Budd ends with a faux-naif ballad
that presents a thoroughly saccharine account of Billy's death, an
277. PLATO, supra note 54, bk. 111, at 93-94.
278. Id. bk. X, at 289.
279. Id. bk. LII, at 67 ("Then, it's appropriate for the rulers, if for anyone at all, to lie for the
benefit of the city . . . .").
280. Id.bk.X,at 291.
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account to match the common sailors' treatment of the very yardarm
from which he was hanged as if it were the true cross itself. In this
account Captain Vere, the philosopher-king, is utterly absent; in this
account emotions, even the most mawkish sentimentality, are given
full play.
What is more, there is good external evidence to indicate that
Melville began Billy Budd as a sort of folk ballad with an accompanying
prose sketch.2 81 Perhaps frustrated by the limitations of that medium, he
wrote the novella in which that ballad is now embedded. Ontogeny, as
they say, recapitulates phylogeny.
In Billy Budd, Melville not only makes Aristotle's point in favor of
fiction over history; he also, and much more significantly, turns on Plato
himself, Plato's own objection to poetry. Melville answers Plato's
objection, in Plato's own terms: Here is the kind of poetry Socrates calls
for in the Republic; here, at least in part, is the proper education for a
philosopher-king.
And precisely here, I'm afraid, Melville tries to prove too much. He
wants to make "spiritual insight" a source of knowledge that supplants
abstract, Platonic reasoning. There he attempts to close a door that Plato
left open, excluding profoundly important light from empirical social
science. As we shall see, "such light as this narrative may afford"28 2 is
not enough for the general needs of law, though it may be enough for
this particular kind of case.
C. Insights from Social Science.
In subsection A, we saw Melville convincingly re-introduce an
element of biblical darkness into the rosy world of Platonic rationalism
through the medium of narrative fiction; in Subpart B, we saw him
answer, in Plato's own terms, Plato's supposed rejection of just such
fiction. On these accomplishments alone, Billy Budd would deserve a
position of honor in the law and literature canon.
In this subsection, however, we must take up a serious problem
with that embrace: Melville seems to have meant to accomplish both
these tasks at the expense of social science, and this deep distrust of
social science neatly meshes with an early and still vigorous interest of
the law and literature movement. We need to see that Melville's
manifest distaste for social science need not be read as global, that any
tendency toward wholesale dismissal would, in fact, be a weakness, not
a strength, of both the novella and the law and literature movement. On a
281. Hayford & Sealts, Introduction, supra note 14, at 2.
282. MELVILLE,BILLY BUDD, supra note 1, at 49.
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more nuanced reading, Billy Budd nicely complements a more healthy
relationship between literature and social science, a relationship that is
itself thoroughly republican.
1. The Apparent Rejection of Social Science
On its face, Melville's novella seems to share a deep distaste for
social science with a broad current of the law and literature movement.
The distaste on the part of the law and literature movement, traceable to
the emerging dominance of law and economics in the 1970s and 1980s,
is well documented; it would be tendentious, but not entirely inaccurate,
to see the law and literature movement, and the law and humanities
movement more generally, as a reaction to the colonization of law and
legal academia by social scientists, especially economists. What we need
to examine closely here is an apparently parallel mistrust in the novella.
To appreciate that mistrust, we must first recall that a central
question posed by the novella is Captain Vere's state of mind, in
particular, whether he was in any sense mentally disturbed. Consider,
against the background of that question, this passage:
By the way, can it be the phenomenon, disowned or at least concealed,
that in some criminal cases puzzles the courts? For this cause have our
juries at times not only to endure the prolonged contentions of lawyers
with their fees, but also the yet more perplexing strife of the medical
experts with theirs? But why leave it to them? Why not subpoena as
well the clerical proficients? Their vocation bringing them into
peculiar contact with so many human beings, and sometimes in their
least guarded hour, in interviews very much more confidential than
those of physician and patient; this would seem to qualify them to
know something about those intricacies involved in the question of
moral responsibility; whether in a given case, say, the crime proceeded
from mania in the brain or rabies of the heart. As to any differences
among themselves these clerical proficients might develop on the
stand, these could hardly be greater than the direct contradictions
exchanged between the remunerated medical experts.283
In the Hayford and Sealts text, now generally accepted as
definitive, this long, damning paragraph is omitted, along with the
separate chapter heading under which it appeared: "Lawyers, Experts,
and Clergy, An Episode." But, as even the proponents of these
omissions concede, the likely reason for Melville's dropping the passage
is not that his views on the subject had changed. Rather, he seems, here
283. BILLY BUDD (Freeman ed.), supra note 224, at 188 (editor's footnotes omitted). For the
reasons given by Hayford and Sealts for their omission, see Hayford & Sealts Introduction, supra
note 14, at 19.
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as in several other critical omitted passages, simply to have worked the
sentiment of the omitted "aside" more seamlessly into the dramatic
elements of the story itself.2 8 4 In the case of the omitted paragraph
quoted above, the questions raised by the narrator there are, in the more
dramatic later version, placed in the mouths of various members of the
drumhead court.2 85 On this view, then, the omission of the aside about
experts reflects formal, rather than substantive, considerations. And thus
Melville's intent was not to eliminate the substantive point, but rather to
make it more powerfully by presenting it in a more aesthetically
appropriate way.
This view is further supported by the fact that, in indisputably
"final" passages, Melville's narrator expressed the same cynicism. Thus,
for example:
But in some supposed cases [of sanity or insanity], in various degrees,
supposedly less pronounced [than with their polar opposition], to draw
the exact line of demarcation few will undertake though for a fee
becoming considerate some professional experts will. There is nothing
nameable but that some men will or undertake to do it for pay.286
But where, if medical experts are to be rejected, even mocked, are
we to look for enlightenment? By what metric are we to mark the line
between such subtle mental states as sanity and insanity? In the single-
sentence paragraph that follows the passage quoted immediately above,
Melville's narrator tells us: "Whether Captain Vere, as the Surgeon
professionally and privately surmised, was really the sudden victim of
any degree of aberration, every one must determine for himself by such
light as this narrative may afford."2 8 7
On its face, this seems an astounding declaration not only of
literature's independence from, but also of its superiority to, other modes
of discourse. On the strongest possible reading, the narrator is directing
us to put aside all other disciplines. This may have been one of the
original appeals of Billy Budd to the emergent law and literature
movement. But, as we say in the law, that would be much too broad a
holding. On the one hand, it would raise a dangerous risk of abuse; on
the other hand, the relationship of social science to literature, in the
novella itself, can be explained much more satisfactorily. We must take
up both these prospects in turn.
284. Hayford & Sealts, Introduction, supra note 14, at 35-37.
285. Id. at 36-37.




2. The Overbroad Reading
Melville in his day, like the early proponents of the law and
literature movement, had good reason to mistrust the overweening
claims of social science. He wrote over a decade before the earliest
Freud, when pseudo-sciences like phrenology and physiognomy288, at
least in America, were widely credited. Even in our own time, with its
comically absurd "twinkie defense"289 and its tragically egregious
"recovered memory syndrome,"90 it is not hard to sympathize with
Melville's skepticism. Indeed, Melville's condemnation of dueling
scientific experts strikingly anticipates contemporary debates, up to the
Supreme Court itself, about just how to define "science" in the context
of expert testimony in the "hard" as well as the social sciences.2 91
But, of course, to accept that, in Melville's time as in our own,
some social science is bad or bogus is not, logically speaking, grounds
for rejecting it all, for throwing out the baby with the bathwater. As the
cultural studies strand of the law and humanities movement has argued,
social science has an important role to play in a truly critical, necessarily
interdisciplinary, analysis of law.292
Beyond that general baby-with-the-bathwater concern, there is a
more particular one that we need to note here, one that involves a long-
standing, core claim of the law and literature movement. From the
movement's beginning, its proponents have claimed to be able to give us
something social science cannot: Insights into what it is like to be
another, the experiences of other people from their own perspective,
from the subjective "inside" of the others themselves, not just the
objective "outside" of science.29 3
It is one thing, however, to say that literature can show us what it
might be like to be someone else, or "other"; it is quite another to say
that it shows us what it really is like. Empathize though we may with
Faulkner's Benjy, at the end of The Sound and the Fury we are still left
with a nagging question: What is it really like to be profoundly
intellectually disabled? We do not, of course, doubt that some people
288. See Tyrus Hillway, Melville's Use of Two Pseudo-Sciences, 64 MOD. LANGUAGE NOTES
145, 145 (1949).
289. See generally People v. White, 172 Cal. Rprtr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see also Robin
L. Barton, Understanding the So-Called 'Twinkie' Defense, CRIME REPORT (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://thecrimereport.org/2017/10/04/understanding-the-so-called-twinkie-defense.
290. See Frederick C. Crews, The Revenge of the Repressed, 41 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, no. 19,
1994, at 1-3; Frederick C. Crews, The Revenge of the Repressed: Part 11, 41 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, no.
20, 1994, at 1-3.
291. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995).
292. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 462-539.
293. See Atkinson, What Is It Like to Be Like That?, supra note 265, at 26-27, 38-39.
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live with the handicap of profound retardation, or that they have some
sort of real and valid interior life. But we cannot really know if Faulkner
has really got that mode of being "right."
And there is an even deeper problem raised by a very different kind
of "interior" account: Could the experiences portrayed in this account
ever have happened at all? Think of the proliferation of alien abduction
accounts; imagine the political impact of The Autobiography of an
Aborted Fetus. We have good reason, then, to worry about over-
generalizing Melville's narrator's invitation to judge his account on its
internal merits alone, without validation from other, external sources.
3. The Narrower Holding
How, then, can Billy Budd work as well as I claim, despite these
epistemological lapses? Several factors work together here. First, as we
have already seen, Melville's narrator himself, within his narrative,
points to sources that are outside both his own reported experience and
the domain of narrative fiction; he relies on his conversations with a
worldly-wise friend, who in turn invokes the insights of the Hebrew
prophets. Melville asks us to rely, not just on his narrative, but more
precisely on "such evidence as this narrative may afford."
What is more, the insistence of Melville's narrator on limiting the
evidentiary record is quite specific; we need not reject the insights of
social science everywhere, but just here, in assessing the credibility of
this particular story. And it is the credibility of the story, not its factual
accuracy, that we are asked to assess. We know, from the outset, that it
is fiction; we are looking, with Aristotle, not for whether these events
actually occurred, but for whether people like this would have acted this
way, whether people like this do act this way. Within that story, all three
of the "exceptional" characters-Billy, Claggart, and Vere-are
plausible; they are tied into either our own experience, or the recorded
experience of credible others: The narrator himself, in the case of
"handsome sailors" like Billy Budd; the darker but nevertheless resonant
texts of Scripture, in the case of Claggart and most importantly,
ourselves, or our intimates, in the case of Captain Vere. This is neither
an alien abduction narrative nor the autobiography of an aborted fetus.
Furthermore, two of the three "exceptional" characters, though
essential to the story, need not be understood "from the inside" for the
story to work in the way that we have outlined. This is not a tale told by
the angelic Billy or the diabolical Claggart, any more than it is a tale told
by an idiot. We only need to believe that there could be characters like
Claggart and Billy; we don't need to know what it is like to be them,
although we do get a fairly strong sense of that in both their cases.
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Indeed, in the case of the handsome sailor, we don't really need to
believe in his kind at all; the narrator himself tells us he is a vanishing
breed by the middle of the nineteenth century. He is needed in the story
only as a plausible proxy of innocence in need of protection. We need,
similarly, to believe that radically evil characters like Claggart exist; we
do not, however, need to believe that the source of their evil is
unfathomably inaccessible to social science, or a product of "nature" as
opposed to "nurture." And nowhere are we asked, in essence, to make
his dark desires and designs even empathetically our own.
On the other hand, the one whose interior life we really do need to
experience vicariously is Vere, and he is the one we are likely to
recognize most readily. Moreover, in recognizing Vere from the
"inside," as us, we have to validate his external reality in the most vital
possible way; we know such people as he exists, with such problems as
he manifests, because we have seen it in ourselves. We have met the
problem, and it is us, or people very like us, the lawyers and others in
positions of leadership and responsibility who, before our very eyes,
make the Vere veer every day. We are pressed back, then, to the ultimate
Socratic maxims: Know thyself; the unexamined life is not worth living.
We need to see that Vere does not follow that maxim, and cannot,
because he does not read books like Melville's or Plato's. And we need
to see that there, but for the grace of such books, go we.
That insight, in turn, helps makes sense of the novella's subtitle, An
Inside Narrative, which has long puzzled critics. Most take it to mean
that the narrator is an insider within Vere's microcosmic shipboard
world.2 94 But here we have another inside dimension: We are being
shown, not just the inside of Vere's world, but the inside of a world that
is, or may well be, our own.
And that brings us around to a deeper, if different, relationship
between Melville's narrative and social science, a relationship that
reaches both back to Plato and forward to Freud. As James Boyd White
has pointed out, the Platonic dialogues ideally work on us, as readers of
the dialogue, the way Socrates's conversations work on his interlocutors
within the dialogue. Just as they come to see themselves as
fundamentally in need of normative reorientation in their conversation
with Socrates, so we see ourselves in our reading of Plato's dialogue, as
we enter, through that dialogue we are reading, into a dialogue with
Plato about the issues Socrates raises within that dialogue. And so, in
reading Melville's "inside" account of Captain Vere, we are invited to
294. Hayford & Sealts, Notes & Commentary, supra note 241, at 134.
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see his tropism, his tendency to veer toward the harder course as a proxy
for the wiser, as our own.
This is also, of course, the classic dynamic of Freudian
psychoanalysis.2 95 The analysand must come to see his or her neurosis,
not from the outside, but from the inside, not as "one's" problem, but as
"my" problem. Only in that way is the patient genuinely able to
overcome the problem, to transcend the neurosis.296
On this view, then, Billy Budd operates not so much as a critique of
the faux social and mental sciences of his day, but as an anticipation of
the insights of clinical psychology very much in the air in the fin de
si~cle Atlantic world. And he is able to anticipate these developments
not only because he is a shrewd if self-taught psychologist himself, but
also because he is practicing, in his own form of dialogue, the kind of
Socratic self-examination that Freud, too, took as both methodologically
and normatively fundamental.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD REPUBLICAN LAW AND LITERARY
CRITICISM
In Part III we read Billy Budd as Melville's offer of a way, within
the law broadly understood, to save both Billy Budd and the fleet, albeit
at the sacrifice of full administrative transparency.29 7 This reading is
republican in two related senses: Its placement of individual life and
public safety above the telling of literal truth, and, more generally, its
insistence on substantive justice, not just literal legality, as the proper
focus of the law and its agents.
In Part IV we read Billy Budd as Melville's response to Plato's
basic challenge to literature and, more generally, as Melville's
reconciliation of fundamental divisions in western culture traceable back
to Plato himself.298 On this reading, Melville, along with Plato,
acknowledges the fundamental educational role of "poetry" in the
training of leaders, for better and for worse. To be sure, he takes issue
with Plato, or at least the rationalist tradition of Plato, on three basic
points: the presence of elemental and irrational evil in humanity; the
positive possibility of using "poetry" to educate philosopher-kings; and
the role of rationalistic social science in understanding the deeper, darker
workings of the human psyche. On each point, however, we can find
295. See SIMON 0. LESSER, FICTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 92-93 (1957) (suggesting that
reading Billy Budd may help resolve psychological conflicts).
296. Id.
297. See supra Part III.A.2.e.
298. See supra Part IV.
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Melville reconciling his position with the imputedly Platonic, even as, in
Part III, we found that Melville offered a broadened understanding of
law that incorporated justice into legality. Thus the reading of Billy Budd
offered in Part IV, like that in Part III, is "republican."
These republican readings, though, suggest a final, tantalizing
question: Are they what Melville actually intended? What Melville
meant, as we have seen, is a question that literary scholars have long
asked, and it is a question that, perhaps, their analytic tools well suit
them to answer. But their long and continuing disagreement suggests a
very real, if pessimistic, prospect: We may never have a definitive
answer. In conclusion, we must see why that uncertainty about
Melville's intent neither undermines Melville's achievement nor this
analysis of that achievement. And we must also see what implications
this, in turn, has for our understanding of law and literary criticism.
The basic point is this: For purposes of our analysis, plausibility is
more important than actual, final "proof." What matters more,
ultimately, is not what Melville meant to say, but what readings we can
give his text without doing it violence, without distorting the meanings
that we can, by standard canons of interpretation, legitimately find there.
This position is something of the converse of Wimsatt's analysis of the
intentionalist fallacy. According to Wimsatt, we must judge writers not
by what they mean to achieve, but by what they actually do achieve.2 99
Just because someone can be seen to have intended a great thing is not
relevant to our assessment of how well they pull it off; aiming high is
hardly an excuse for missing, and certainly no virtue in its own right.
If discernable ambition is irrelevant to measuring literary merit,
though, we can also make a peculiar converse point, about the absence
of discernable intention: We should give a writer credit for what he, in
fact, does achieve whether or not that was, or can be proved to be, his
actual or conscious or "real" intent. If we can show that he has done
something great, we must credit that on its own merit. If, then, I am right
that Melville has answered both the law and Plato in their own terms-
and, beyond that, in ways that expand those very terms-then we must
credit Melville for that achievement, whether or not he had it
consciously in mind.
We should also notice that what we credit Melville lies outside of,
and hence expands, any "purely" or "strictly" literary standard of
achievement: He has showed us a bigger, better understanding of law; he
299. W.K. Wirnsatt Jr. & M.C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 SEWANEE REv.468,477
("[T]here is danger of confusing personal and poetic studies; and there is the fault of writing the
personal as if it were poetic.").
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has showed us a way to resolve, at least some of the time, some of the
deepest divides in western culture. For us to appropriate those lessons,
however, we must already have had a very sophisticated understanding
of law, and a very broad knowledge of culture. Billy Budd points us, at
bottom, not so much to the reading we must someday do, as to the
reading we must have already done.
Literary scholars, we have said, must have a deeper understanding
of law if they are to see what Melville offers to tell us about law. On this
view, their tendency to derive a pessimistic estimation of the capabilities
of law from the text of the novella is quite possibly not the fault of the
novella, or of the law, but of their critical apparatus. On this view,
literature has at least as much to learn from law as to teach it, precisely
because Billy Budd is a legal, not just a literary, text.
The corresponding message for legal scholars and legal education,
however, is no basis for self-congratulation. It is, rather, a severely
damning indictment, on republican grounds, of the law, and especially
the legal education, of our time. If we lawyers, like Vere, are limited in
our readings, we risk not just diminishing our own lives but, on account
of that very diminution, literally destroying the lives of others. We have
seen that, if literary criticism does not know law, including the subtler
aspects of jurisprudence, it cannot know the republican lessons of Billy
Budd. But what are we to say if law schools graduate a generation of
leaders who know neither literature nor jurisprudence? In republican
terms, we cannot expect our republic to be governed well-more
precisely, we cannot expect to govern our republic well.
There is, thankfully, a more promising possibility, and a final and
more fundamentally republican reading of Billy Budd. We can take
Melville's novella as a dialogue, as an invitation to engage with others-
with every available voice in our culture and our history-in a
continuing discourse about justice, about the commonwealth, res
publica-about, in a word, the Republic.
And so may it be.
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